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Recently developed techniques in automatic synthesis of correct-by-construction
robot controllers from a set of high-level task specifications offer a number of advan-
tages over other, more traditional, methods of programming robots. Such synthesis tech-
niques allow for quick, intuitive creation of controllers for complex tasks, such that the
resulting controller is guaranteed to satisfy its underlying task specification. This guar-
antee, however, is predicated on the assumption that the robot operates without error in
its sensing and actuation.
My Ph.D. dissertation provides methods for probabilistically modeling errors in the
robot’s sensors and actuators, and using those models to compute the probability that
the robot (running such a synthesized controller) will exhibit the desired behavior. Fur-
thermore, I provide methods for leveraging that analysis of the controller to automati-
cally provide the user with suggestions for revisions to the task specification, in order
to improve the robot’s probabilistic behavior. Finally, I discuss the incorporation of the
sensor/actuator error models into the actual synthesis step. By considering the error
models, we can synthesize the controller that is most likely to satisfy the given specifi-
cation, when operating with the modeled errors. This work provides an important tool
for reliably applying controller synthesis techniques to real-world problems, where the
robot’s sensors and actuators are imperfect.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The increasingly common-place and complex use of autonomous systems has created
a need for techniques that allow for the rapid creation and deployment reliable robot
controllers. That is: one should be able to quickly and easily create or modify robot
controllers in such a way that the controller will operate in the intended manner. To this
end, techniques such as [37] use formal methods to automatically synthesize a correct-
by-construction robot controller from a higher-level task specification. Such methods
ease the technical burden of creating a complex controller, and do so in a manner that
provides guarantees on the resulting behavior of the robot. Such guarantees commonly
make the assumption that the robot operates without errors in its sensing and actuation;
the work presented in this thesis relaxes that assumption, and investigates the probabilis-
tic analysis, synthesis, and revision of such controllers.
Chapter 2 of this thesis presents an approach for reasoning about the effects of sen-
sor error on high-level robot behavior. It considers robot controllers that are synthesized
from high-level, temporal logic task specifications such that the resulting robot behavior
is guaranteed to satisfy these specifications when assuming perfect sensors and actua-
tors, and relaxes the assumption of perfect sensing. The behavior of the system is then
modeled probabilistically, and the probability with which the controller satisfies a set of
temporal logic specifications can be calculated using model checking techniques. This
chapter considers both parametric representations, where the satisfaction probability is
found as a function of the model parameters, and numerical representations, allowing
for the analysis of large examples. It also considers models in which some parts of the
environment and sensor have unknown transition probabilities, and describes a method
to determine upper and lower bounds for the probability. The approach is illustrated
with two examples that provide insight into unintuitive effects of sensor error that can
1
2inform the specification design process.
Chapter 3 of this thesis relaxes the assumption on both sensing and actuation, and
describes a method for probabilistically analyzing the behavior of a robot controller that
is synthesized from a set of temporal logic specifications, when the robot operates with
uncertainty in its sensing and actuation. The described approach creates a probabilistic
model of the system and uses probabilistic model checking techniques to find the prob-
ability that it satisfies some set of specifications. Additionally, this chapter presents a
method which leverages that analysis to provide automated feedback to the user in the
form of suggested revisions to the task specification or low-level components, in order
to increase the probability that the robot successfully accomplishes its task.
The automatic synthesis of robot controllers from high-level specifications offers a
number of advantages over more traditional programming approaches. One such ad-
vantage is that the synthesized controller is verifiably correct; that is, it is guaranteed to
satisfy all of its underlying specifications given the assumption of perfect sensing and
actuation. The work presented in Chapter 4 relaxes this assumption, and synthesizes
a discrete controller that minimizes a cost function which captures the probability that
the robot will violate a given temporal logic formula, while constrained by the original
task specification. This chapter discusses the cost function and controller synthesis, and
illustrates the approach with an example problem.
Chapter 5 fuses the probabilistic results of dynamic obstacle anticipation with the
deterministic decision making of a formally synthesized robot controller running on a
full-sized autonomous vehicle. The obstacle anticipation (used to calculate the prob-
ability of collision with dynamic obstacles around the vehicle) is abstracted to a set
of Boolean observations, which are then used by the synthesized controller (a state ma-
chine generated from temporal logic task specifications). The obstacle anticipation, sen-
sor abstraction, and synthesized controller are implemented on a full-scale autonomous
3vehicle, and experimental data is collected and compared to a formal analysis of the
probabilistic behavior of the system. A comparison of the results shows good agree-
ment between the formal analysis and the experimental results.
CHAPTER 2
PROBABILISTIC GUARANTEES FOR HIGH-LEVEL ROBOT BEHAVIOR IN
THE PRESENCE OF SENSOR ERROR
2.1 Introduction
The creation of robot controllers for complex tasks is an arduous and error-prone pro-
cess, requiring the iterative design and testing of large, complex controllers. One in-
creasingly popular approach is to employ hybrid controllers that allow for discrete
switching among a set of individual, continuous controllers. Such controllers are, how-
ever, difficult and time-consuming to create and test. One method to address this prob-
lem is through the automated creation and verification of controllers. Recently, re-
searchers have developed methods for automatically synthesizing complex, hybrid con-
trollers from high-level task specifications in a manner that provides guarantees about
the behavior of the robot [4, 8, 17, 34, 36, 37, 44, 55, 56, 62].
Such methods use temporal logic formulas to specify a variety of complex behaviors
(such as “go to the bedroom, but avoid the kitchen” or “if sensing a person, then radio for
help”), and cover a variety of capabilities and applications. The approaches presented
in [34] and [32], for example, facilitate the creation of non-reactive controllers (i.e. the
behavior does not depend on changes in the environment) for complex motion plan-
ning. Conversely, [37] and [62] focus on creating controllers that react to the system’s
perception of environmental inputs. Another example of differing approaches is that of
[16] and [61] when compared to [4] and [32]; the former two methods use feedback
controllers, while the latter use sampling-based methods to allow for motion planning
involving complex dynamics and environments, at the expense of completeness.
Previous work facilitated the creation of controllers that were guaranteed to satisfy
their underlying specifications, but such guarantees were based on the assumption of
4
5perfect sensing and actuation; that is, such controllers assumed that the robot knows the
exact state of the environment in which it operates, and that the outcomes of all robot
actions are deterministic. While we maintain the assumption of perfect actuation, in this
paper, we relax the assumption of perfect sensing, incorporating uncertainty into the
sensor abstractions. After creating a model of the system, we use probabilistic analysis
to investigate the correctness of the high-level behavior of the controllers.
Related work includes [42], in which the authors control linear, stochastic systems
with temporal logic specifications by constructing a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
and using model checking algorithms to find an execution satisfying the specifications.
Building on the work presented in [34], they then define a sequence of controllers to
maximize the probability of following the execution obtained from the model checking
algorithms.
Similarly, in [43] the authors propose an algorithm for finding a desirable control
strategy for motion planning in the presence of noise. By treating the outcome of the
low-level motion controllers (i.e. the transitions between regions) in a probabilistic fash-
ion, the authors were able to find, under known operating conditions, the control strategy
most likely to satisfy the given specifications. They consider scenarios in which actua-
tor uncertainty and uncertainty in the continuous sensor (i.e. location within a specified
region), result in probabilistic transitions between states. The sensor abstraction (i.e.
which discrete region the robot is in), however, is still assumed to be perfect.
The work presented in [10] extends this approach, allowing for the synthesized con-
trol strategy to react to time-varying observations of the environment. These obser-
vations are modeled as independent and identically distributed probabilities, and the
authors present an approach for generating a reactive control strategy that maximizes
the probability that the robot satisfies a given temporal logic formula.
In this paper, we assume perfect actuation, and analyze the effect of sensor false-
6positives and false-negatives. Specifically, we model the system as either a Discrete-
Time Markov Chain (DTMC) or an MDP, and use probabilistic model-checking tech-
niques to perform an offline analysis of the robot’s satisfaction of behavioral specifi-
cations defined as temporal logic formulas. In the case where the behavior of the en-
vironment and sensors can be models with a set of known probabilities, the system is
modeled as a DTMC, and an expected satisfaction probability can be found. If the event
frequencies or sensor accuracies are unknown, the system is modeled as an MDP, and
bounds are found for the minimum and maximum probability that a specification is sat-
isfied. In both cases, the analysis provides insights into the effects of specific sensor
errors on the high-level specification guarantees, and can be used to inform adjustments
to the specifications, improvements to the sensors, and changes to the controller, in an
effort to improve the robot’s performance.
We consider a parametric model checking algorithm, based on the algorithm de-
scribed in [22]. This algorithm calculates the probability with which the system model
satisfies a set of temporal logic formulas, as a function of the model parameters; ob-
taining such a function allows for rapid evaluation of the performance of the system
given known sensor error, or the calculation of bounds on sensor accuracy for a desired
performance level. Models with large state-spaces and many transitions can become
intractable for our current implementation of the algorithm; for these cases, we use the
PRISM [41] probabilistic model checking tool with the same system model and specifi-
cations to find a numerical probability for the satisfaction of the specifications. The key
difference between the two techniques is that the parametric model checking algorithm
computes a formula for the probability, as a function of the system parameters (sensor
error and environment event frequencies), while PRISM is used to evaluate the proba-
bility at a specific valuation of the parameter; while the initial computational cost of the
parametric formula is higher, individual evaluations of the formula are computationally
7very cheap.
The work presented in the paper is, to the best of our knowledge, novel; it addresses
a different but related problem to that addressed in the most closely related literature:
[42, 43], and [10]. In [42, 43], the authors present a method for synthesizing a non-
reactive controller that maximizes the probability of satisfying a temporal logic formula.
In this work, we provide a method for analyzing the effects of erroneousness high-
level sensing on the behavior of a reactive controller. Analysis of the controller after
the synthesis stage provides insight into specific sources of error; such insights enable
targeted improvements of the controller and sensors. The presented work also differs
from that presented in [10], which allows for the observation of probabilistic properties
of the environment but does not investigate the truth of those observations (i.e. the
uncertainty is in the outcome of the robot’s motion primitives, not in the accuracy of the
high-level observations).
The research and results presented in this paper are a continuation of those presented
in [28]. Most notably, this paper adds the capability of using MDPs to model and analyze
a system in which the environment model is not precisely known (i.e. event frequencies
are unknown). In either case, it is important that the modeled probabilities accurately
capture the characteristics of the system being modeled. In [27] the authors apply this
approach to the problem of an autonomous car navigating an urban environment; they
anticipate the behavior of dynamic obstacles and abstract the anticipated probability of
collision to a binary value representing the safety of different maneuvers at intersections.
The authors then use Monte-Carlo simulation statistics to model the sensor error and
environment behavior, and evaluate the safety of the vehicle. The results obtained from
the formal analysis compare favorably with those found in simulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes the background
information, and Section 2.3 formally defines the problem. Section 2.4 describes our
8approach and the algorithms we use to analyze the effect of sensor error. Section 2.5
presents two illustrative examples and their results. Conclusions are given in Section
2.6.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
The syntax of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is defined using a set of atomic propositions
(pi ∈ Π), the set of boolean operators (“not”: ¬, “and”: ∧), and the set of temporal op-
erators (“next”: ©, “until”: U). The syntax for the language is then defined recursively
as follows.
φ ::= true | pi | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | © φ | φUφ
We can define the additional boolean operators ∨ (“or”),→ (“implies”) and↔ (“if
and only if”) using ¬ and ∧. Likewise,© and U can be used to define the operators ♦
(“eventually”) and  (“always”).
To define the semantics of LTL, let ω represent an infinite sequence of states in a
transition system [14]. Let ωi ⊆ 2Π be the labeling of the state at position i in the
infinite sequence ω with a subset of Π that is true at time i. Intuitively, pi is true iff
pi ∈ ωi, and ©φ is true if the formula φ is true in the next step (at state ωi+1). The
formula ♦φ = trueUφ is true if φ holds in at least one state in ω, while φ = ¬♦¬φ
is true if φ holds for all states in ω. For a formal definition of the semantics of LTL, the
reader is referred to [14].
We consider a restricted class of LTL formulae [51] of the form ϕ = (ϕe → ϕs). The
formula ϕ represents the desired robot dynamics ϕs for an environment ϕe; the formula
ϕe also serves to place constraining assumptions on the behavior of the environment.
9We assign ϕe and ϕs the following structure.
ϕe = ϕ
e
i ∧ ϕet ∧ ϕeg
ϕs = ϕ
s
i ∧ϕst ∧ϕsg
In the preceding formulas, ϕst represents the safety requirements for the robot, which
require certain behaviors to always be satisfied (e.g. “always stop when sensing a red
light”). It consists of a conjunction of formulas of the form Bi, where each Bi is
a Boolean formula over Π ∪ ©Π (e.g. (©RedLight → ©Stop)). ϕsg represents
the specified liveness for the robot, which requires that some desirable behavior occurs
infinitely often (e.g. “while not stopped, repeatedly visit the parking lot”). It consists of
a conjunction of formulas of the form ♦Bj , where each Bj is a boolean formula over
Π (e.g. ♦(¬Stop → ParkingLot)). The remaining portion of ϕs (ϕsi ) represents the
set of initial conditions for the robot, and the components of ϕe represent the initial (ϕei ),
safety (ϕet ), and liveness (ϕ
e
g) assumptions on the environment. For more information,
see [51].
2.2.2 Labeled Transition Systems (LTS)
A Labeled Transition System (LTS) is a tuple A = {S, S0,Σ, δ,Π, L} where S is a set
of states, S0 is the set of initial states and Σ is the input alphabet. The transition relation
δ : S× 2Σ → S defines the possible labeled transitions (si, σij, sj) for σij ⊆ Σ. Π is the
set of atomic propositions labeling the states, and the function L : S → 2Π labels each
state with a set of symbols belonging to the set Π.
2.2.3 Discrete Time Markov Chains
A Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) is defined as a tuple D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π,L},
where Q defines a finite set of states with the set of initial states Q0. The transition
10
function ∆ : Q × Q → P defines the probability p ∈ P with which state qi ∈ Q
transitions to state qj ∈ Q, where P = (0, 1]. Π is the set of atomic propositions
labeling the states, and the function L : Q→ 2Π labels each state with a set of symbols
belonging to the set Π.
2.2.4 Markov Decision Processes
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are an extension of DTMCs, which include the
labeling of the transitions, allowing for nondeterministic choices. An MDP is defined
as a tupleM = {Q,Q0,Σ,∆MDP ,Π,L} where Q defines a finite set of states with the
set of initial states Q0. The transition function ∆MDP : Q × 2Σ × Q → P defines the
probability p ∈ P of transitioning from state qi ∈ Q to state qj ∈ Q, given the input
σij ⊆ Σ, where P = (0, 1]. Π is the set of atomic propositions labeling the states, and
the function L : Q→ 2Π labels each state with a set of symbols belonging to the set Π.
2.3 Problem Statement
We consider automatically-synthesized robot controllers (e.g. [37]) for which the robot
is guaranteed to achieve a given high-level specification, if perfect sensing and actuation
are assumed. To analyze the behavior of the controller under sensor error, we define
models for the robot controller, the environment behavior and the sensor error.
The robot controller, R, is defined as an LTS where the input set Σ is a set of binary
propositions X¯ = {x¯1, . . . , x¯m} that represent the information that the robot can attain
about the environment via its sensors. Y = {r1, . . . , rn, a1, . . . , ak} is the set of binary
robot propositions (Π) used to label the states. The set of propositions {r1, . . . , rn}
represents the location of the robot in a partitioned environment, where proposition ri is
true if and only if the robot is in region i. The set {a1, . . . , ak} is the set of propositions
11
that can be activated by the robot (e.g. the action Stop), where proposition aj is true if
and only if the robot is performing action j. The controller synthesis defines the possible
states of the system S, the initial states S0, the transition function δ, and the labeling
function L.
The environment behavior, E, is captured by a specified set of transition probabil-
ities P (X ′|X, Y ) defining the probability of the next environment proposition values
X ′ = {x′1, . . . , x′m}, given the current environment and robot values, X and Y respec-
tively. This formulation allows us, if applicable, to place assumptions on the behavior
of the environment (by setting transition probabilities to 0 or 1). For example, we may
restrict the value of RedLight to be false in non-intersection regions, resulting in a 0
probability transition to a state in which RedLight is true and the robot is not in an Inter-
section. Such assumptions enable us to generate controllers that do not need to satisfy
the desired specification for any arbitrary environment, but rather only for a restricted set
of allowable environments. The environmental assumptions, which restrict the values of
X , are captured in the temporal logic formula ϕe.
The sensor behavior, E¯, is modeled with the set of probabilities P (X¯ ′|X ′, X¯, Y )
defining the values of the next sensor propositions X¯ ′ = {x¯′1, . . . , x¯′m} given the next
environment values, X ′, and the current proposition values of the sensors and the robot,
X¯ and Y respectively. Such a model allows the for the presence of false negatives
(x¯′ = False, x′ = True) and false positives (x¯′ = True, x′ = False) in the abstracted
sensor values.
In the case where either the environment or sensor behavior is not completely known
(i.e. we do not have all of the transition probabilities for E or E¯, respectively), we
can instead model the behavior as an MDP. In this case, the transitions consist of a
non-deterministic choice corresponding to the proposition(s) for which the transition
probabilities are unknown. Propositions with known transition probabilities are modeled
12
within each non-deterministic choice.
The final piece we define is the system specification, Φ, for the robot. It is expressed
as a set of LTL formulas {φ1, . . . , φl} that are part of the temporal logic formula ϕs [37].
In particular, we are interested in analyzing the behavior of the robot with respect to the
safety and liveness constraints (ϕst and ϕ
s
g, respectively).
Previous work has shown that, given assumptions on the environment behavior and
specifications for the robot behavior, a controller can be synthesized, such that the robot
is guaranteed to behave correctly in all admissible environments (i.e. E ‖ R |= φ , ∀φ ∈
Φ), should such a controller exist [37]. This guarantee, however, can only be made when
perfect sensors and actuators are assumed (i.e. E = E¯).
The focus of this paper is on the following problem.
Problem: Given a model of the robot controller R, and models of the environment
E and sensors E¯, determine the probability that the synthesized robot controller will
satisfy a set of high level specifications when the sensor outputs contain false positives
and false negatives. That is, given that E 6= E¯, find p(E ‖ R¯ |= φ) ∀φ ∈ Φ where
R¯ = E¯ ‖ R. For a model of the system where the environment or sensor model is
incomplete (i.e. an MDP), find the upper and lower bounds on the probabilities, pmin
and pmax.
2.4 Approach
To analyze the behavior of a synthesized controller (R) under sensor error, we compose
it with models of the environment (E) and sensors (E¯), and use probabilistic model
checking techniques on the resulting model (DTMC or MDP) to assess the performance
of the controller with respect to a set of LTL formulas. Figure 2.1 is a graphical overview
of this process.
In the following, we describe an algorithm for creating a DTMC representing the
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Figure 2.1: A flow chart of the approach presented in this paper for analyzing the cor-
rectness of a controller that is generated from high-level task specifications.
composition of the controller with the environment and sensor model and discuss two
approaches to analyzing the robot’s behavior. The primary method we use is a para-
metric model checking algorithm, based on the work described in [22]. This algo-
rithm returns the probabilities as rational functions over a set of variables, in our case,
representing the environmental event frequency (P (X ′|X, Y )) and sensor error rates
(P (X¯ ′|X ′, X¯, Y )). Thus, we are able to provide information not only on the probability
a specification is satisfied given the sensor error but also on the sensor error bounds that
are required for a given desired specification probability.
In addition to the parametric model checking algorithm, we discuss the use of the
off-the-shelf probabilistic model checker PRISM [39, 41] to evaluate probabilities when
numeric model parameters are given (non-parametric). Additionally, this tool supports
the analysis of systems that are modeled as MDPs. Such analysis allows us to find
bounds on the probability for models in which the behavior of the environment or sen-
sors cannot be fully characterized.
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2.4.1 Building the DTMC
Analysis of a synthesized controller using the probabilistic model checking algorithm
requires first that a model of the complete system be composed from the known models
of the environment, sensors, and robot automaton. This process is described in Algo-
rithm 1. The inputs are the LTS for the robot controller, the set of atomic propositions
Π = X ∪ X¯ ∪ Y , the environment transition probabilities P (X ′|X, Y ) and the sensor
transition probabilities P (X¯ ′|X ′, X¯, Y ).
Given these inputs, the algorithm defines a set of probabilistic states for each deter-
ministic state si ∈ S, such that the new probabilistic state is labeled with the combi-
nation of the environment propositions Xj = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ 2X , the sensor proposi-
tions X¯ i, and the labels of the deterministic robot state (lines 3-6). The set of sensor
propositions X¯ i is defined by the labels on the transition (in the controller LTS) into
the deterministic state si, from any predecessor sh. Any probabilistic state created from
si ∈ S0 is then added to the set of initial states for the complete system (lines 7-8). The
probabilistic transition function ∆ : Q×Q → FV is then defined for all pairs of states
(qij, qkl) such that the underlying deterministic pair (si, sk) is in the transition function
δ, and the probability function fijkl ∈ FV (the rational function representing the prob-
ability of transitioning from state qij to qkl) is non-zero (lines 9-14). The notation in
this algorithm uses the indices i and k to refer to individual states in the LTS for the
synthesized controller, and the indices j and l to indicate different configurations of the
environment; the state qij in the DTMC then refers to the state obtained by combining
the controller state si with the sensor inputs X¯ i and the environment configuration Xj .
The resulting DTMC D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π,L} can then be used to analyze the perfor-
mance of the controller.
To illustrate this process, consider a simple robot controller with one sensor x¯. The
controller enters state s1 when the sensor proposition x¯ is true. Due to the presence
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Algorithm 1 Define DTMC
1: procedure PROBDTMC(A = {S, S0, X¯, δ, Y, L}, Π = X ∪ X¯ ∪ Y,
P (X ′|X, Y ), P (X¯ ′|X ′, X¯, Y ))
2: Q = ∅, Q0 = ∅
3: for si ∈ S do
4: for Xj ∈ 2X do
5: Q = Q ∪ qij
6: L(qij) = Xj ∪ X¯ i ∪ L(si) s.t. (sh, X¯ i, si) ∈ δ
7: if si ∈ S0 then
8: Q0 = Q0 ∪ qij
9: for (si, X¯k, sk) ∈ δ do
10: Y i = L(si)
11: for (qij, qkl) ∈ Q×Q do
12: fijkl = P (X
l|Xj, Y i)× P (X¯k|X l, X¯ i, Y i)
13: if fijkl 6= 0 then
14: ∆ = ∆ ∪ (qij, fijkl, qkl)
15: return D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π,L}
of false-positives, however, this sensor proposition may be true when the environment
proposition x is false (as well as when x is true). From the state s1, the algorithm creates
2 separate states for the DTMC: q11 (where x is true) and q12 (where x is false). In both
states, the sensor proposition x¯ is true, and they share the labels of the controller state
s1. A second controller state s2 similarly results in the states q21 and q22 Which share the
labels of s2 and x¯ = false. The algorithm then calculates the transition probabilities for
all of the state pairs from q11 or q12 to q21 or q22. If the transition probability is non-zero,
the state-probability-state tuple is added to the transition function ∆.
Additionally, we can define a bounded system by unfolding the DTMC found in
Algorithm 1 over the range of time 0 ≤ t ≤ T where T is the desired time bound.
Enforcing a bound on the system allows for the analysis of a finite execution of the robot,
similar to performing bounded model checking on the DTMC. This process is described
in Algorithm 2. Intuitively, this process can be seen as building a tree such that root
nodes are defined as the set of initial states Q0, and each new level (referring to the next
time step) is defined as the union of the sets of successors for each state in the preceding
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level of the tree. Each state qi,t in the bounded system encodes both the discrete state
qi in the unbounded DTMC, and the respective time step t. This process is repeated for
each time step t ≤ T , and the resulting DTMC Dbound = {Qbound, Q0,∆bound,Π,L, V }
is the bounded system.
Algorithm 2 Bound DTMC
1: procedure BOUNDSYS(D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π,L, V }, T )
2: Qprev = Q0
3: Qbound = {qi,0 | ∃i s.t. qi ∈ Q0}
4: Q00 = Qbound
5: t = 1
6: while t ≤ T do
7: Qnew = ∅
8: for qi ∈ Qprev do
9: for (fij, qj) s.t. (qi, fij, qj) ∈ ∆ do
10: Qnew = Qnew ∪ qj
11: Qbound = Qbound ∪ qj,t
12: L(qj,t) = L(qj)
13: ∆bound = ∆bound ∪ (qi,t−1, fij, qj,t)
14: Qprev = Qnew
15: t = t+ 1
16: return Dbound = {Qbound, Q00 ,∆bound,Π,L, V }
2.4.2 Parametric Model Checking
Given a probabilistic system model as defined in Section 2.4.1, we find a formula repre-
senting the probability with which it satisfies a specification of the form φ = ♦ϕ (resp.
φ = ϕ = ¬♦¬ϕ), as a function of the system parameters. For the latter case, we
find the probability of always satisfying ϕ by calculating the probability of eventually
satisfying ¬ϕ, and subtracting it from 1 (giving us the probability of not eventually sat-
isfying ¬ϕ). This process is described in Algorithm 3, and is based on the algorithm
in [22]. Intuitively, lines 2-5 of the algorithm find the set of states B ⊆ Q that satisfy
the formula ϕ (resp. ¬ϕ). From this set of target states, we use a minimum fixed-point
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operation to reduce the model to the set of states from which at least one target state is
reachable (line 6). Line 7 then calls Algorithm 5, to find the probability of reaching the
set of target states from an initial state. The function P (resp. 1 − P) represents the
probability that the formula φ = ♦ϕ (resp. φ = ϕ) is satisfied by the DTMC.
Algorithm 3 Parametric Model Checking
1: procedure PARAMETRICMC(D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π,L}, φ,X, Y )
2: if φ = ϕ then
3: (B,∆) = TargetStates(Q,∆,¬ϕ,L, X, Y )
4: else
5: (B,∆) = TargetStates(Q,∆, ϕ,L, X, Y )
6: Qreach = ReduceStates(Q,B,∆)
7: P = Eliminate(Qreach, Q0, B,∆)
8: if φ = ϕ then
9: P = 1− P
10: return P
Algorithm 4 defines the process of finding the set of states that satisfy a given for-
mula φ. To do this, we look at two distinct forms of φ. In the first case, φ is a boolean
formula over the values of X and Y in a single state (in this paper, we examine the
performance of the controller with respect to the environment, and do not use X¯ in any
of the formulas). For such a formula, the set of target states can be found by looping
through all of the states in the model. At each state, we map each atomic proposition
in the formula to a T/F value, based on the state label (line 6). If the resulting formula
evaluates to true, we add that state to the set of target states and remove all transitions
out of it, treating it as a sink (lines 7-9).
The second case is that for which φ is a boolean formula over propositions in the
current and next state (X , Y ,©X ,©Y ). For this case, we create a single goal state q∗
and loop though each pair of states (qi, qj) where qj is a successor of qi. We then map
each atomic proposition to a T/F value based on the state qj if it is under the scope of
a “next” operator (line 18), or based on the state qi otherwise (line 17). If the formula
is true when evaluated over the pair, the transition from qi to qj is removed and the
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Algorithm 4 Find Target States
1: procedure TARGETSTATES(Q,∆, φ,L, X, Y )
2: if φ is a formula over {X, Y } then
3: B = ∅
4: for qi ∈ Q do
5: for a ∈ {X, Y } do
6: φ[a 7→ (a ∈ L(qi))]
7: if eval(φ)==True then
8: B = B ∪ qi
9: ∆ = ∆\(qi, fij, qj) ∀ qj ∈ post(qi)
10: else if φ is a formula over {X, Y,©X,©Y } then
11: Q = Q ∪ q∗
12: B = {q∗}
13: for qi ∈ Q\q∗ do
14: fi∗ = 0
15: for qj ∈ post(qi) do
16: for a ∈ {X, Y } do
17: φ[a 7→ (a ∈ L(qi))]
18: φ[©a 7→ (a ∈ L(qj))]
19: if eval(φ)==True then
20: fi∗ = fi∗ + fij
21: ∆ = ∆\(qi, fij, qj)
22: if fi∗ 6= 0 then
23: ∆ = ∆ ∪ (qi, fi∗, q∗)
24: return B,∆
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transition probability is added to the transition from qi to q∗ (lines 19-21).
Given the set of initial states Q0, the set of goal states B, the set of states Qreach
that can reach B, and the transition function ∆, we can now eliminate all intermedi-
ate states from the model, until we are left with only the initial states, the goal states,
and the associated transition probabilities. Algorithm 5 describes this process, and the
calculation of the probability with which our model will reach a target state from a
specified initial state. This algorithm follows the process described in [22], and can
intuitively be described as removing an intermediate state qi and accounting for the
probability with which a predecessor q1 ∈ Pre(qi) will transition through qi to a suc-
cessor q2 ∈ Post(qi), for all pairs (q1, q2) (lines 5-9). Once all intermediate states are
eliminated, the probability with which the system will reach a state satisfying φ is the
sum of transition probabilities from the initial state to each goal state (adjusting for
self-transitions) (line 10).
Algorithm 5 State Elimination
1: procedure ELIMINATE(Qreach, Q0, B,∆)
2: for q0 ∈ Q0 do
3: Qelim = Qreach\{B, q0}
4: for qi ∈ Qelim do
5: for (q1, q2) ∈ Pre(qi)× Post(qi) do
6: f12 = f12 + f1i
1
1−fiifi2
7: (q1, f12, q2) ∈ ∆
8: ∆ = ∆\{(q1, f1i, qi), (qi, fi2, q2)}
9: Qelim = Qelim\qi
10: P(q0, B) = 11−f00
∑
b∈B f0b
11: return P
Our implementation of the preceding algorithms is done in Python, using the Sympy-
Core toolbox [49] to perform the symbolic manipulations. This prototypical implemen-
tation is limited primarily by the number of transitions in the composed system model
(though it is also affected by other factors such as the number of states or the length of
the LTL formula); we found that it can reasonably handle systems with roughly 3,000
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transitions, but encounters computational issues with larger models. A more optimized
implementation would likely alleviate many of these issues, and allow for faster calcula-
tions of the parametric formulas. The theoretical complexity of the algorithm is linear in
the length of the formula φ in Algorithm 4 [40], and cubic in the number of transitions
to be eliminated in Algorithm 5 [22].
2.4.3 PRISM Non-Parametric Model Checking
In place of the Parametric Model Checking algorithm discussed above, we can also use
the off-the-shelf model checking software PRISM [41], with the same system model and
specifications, to analyze the performance of the controller. The PRISM software allows
for calculating the probability that the system model satisfies an LTL formula, but it does
not use parametric algorithms, restricting the evaluation to specific numerical valuations
of the system model. In particular, we use PRISM to evaluate models that are too large
for our current implementation of the parametric algorithm. The theoretical complexity
of LTL model checking is, in general, exponential in the size of the LTL formula (though
in our application the size of the LTL formula tends to be reasonably small), and linear
in the size of the system model [53].
In addition to being able to analyze the probability that a particular DTMC satisfies
an LTL specification, PRISM can also be used to analyze the minimum and maximum
probabilities that a specification is satisfied by an MDP. This capability allows for find-
ing some measure of the performance of the controller under models where the envi-
ronment behavior can not be modeled with known probabilities, but, instead, must be
modeled as non-deterministic transitions. In such cases, we still restrict the behavior of
the environment according to ϕe, but do not attach probabilities to the transitions in E.
Inclusion of probabilities in E¯ allows for the analysis of the behavior of the controller
under partially unknown environments.
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Figure 2.2: Workspace for the example of a housekeeping robot. The robot can transi-
tion across boundaries marked with dashed lines, but not those marked with solid lines.
2.5 Examples
2.5.1 Example 1: Housekeeping Robot
Scenario: A housekeeping robot moves about an environment that is divided into five
separate regions, as shown in Figure 2.2. It is tasked with searching the Bedroom,
Kitchen, and Living rooms, and performing the action Clean whenever it senses a Mess.
Additionally, when the robot senses LDone (signaling that the laundry is done), it must
return to the LRoom (laundry room), and perform the action Fold. Doing so marks the
end of the robot’s task.
Controller: The controller for this example was synthesized from a set of high-
level task specifications, using the LTLMoP [18] toolkit. An abridged set of the LTL
specifications used to generate the controller is given below.
• (©Mess↔©Clean)
“Clean any and all Messes”
• ((©LDone ∧ LRoom)↔©Fold)
“Fold if and only if the Laundry is Done and you are in the LRoom”
• ♦((¬LDone ∧ ¬Mess)→ Bedroom)
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“If you are not sensing Mess or LDone, then visit Bedroom”
• ♦((LDone ∧ ¬Mess)→ LRoom)
“If you are sensing LDone but not Mess, then visit LRoom”
Environment: The behavior of the environment propositions r Mess and r LDone
(the prefix r is used to indicate that it is a reflection of the “real” world), is captured
by the automaton shown in Figure 2.3. The transition probabilities are defined with
the parameters fMess00, fMess11, and fLDone00, which represent the probability that
r Mess remains false, r Mess remains true, and r LDone remains false, respectively.
Each environment proposition is also restricted according to the environmental assump-
tions defined in ϕe, and listed below.
• (LRoom→ ¬©Mess)
“No Messes in LRoom”
• (LDone→©LDone)
“Once true, LDone stays true”
Sensors: The two sensor propositions s Mess and s LDone were modeled as
shown in Figure 2.4. The prefix s indicates that the variables refer to the “sensed”
Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of the environment model, with probabilities and
necessary conditions given for each transition.
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Figure 2.4: Graphical representation of the sensor model, with probabilities and neces-
sary conditions given for each transition.
values of the corresponding environment propositions. The transition probabilities were
defined by the parameters aMess, referring to the probability with which the s Mess sen-
sor correctly mimics the value of r Mess, and aLDone, which represents the probability
of a correct reading of r LDone.
Analysis properties: For this example problem, the robot controller, R, consisted
of 70 states. Because the task specification includes multiple liveness conditions, the
robot must account for which liveness condition it is attempting to satisfy in each state,
resulting in states that are not necessarily unique with respect to their labeled proposi-
tions. Composing the controller with the probabilistic environment and sensor models
yielded a system with 280 states and 2346 probabilistic transitions. We analyzed the
controller with respect to the following properties.
1. (Clean↔ r Mess)
“Clean any and all Messes”
2. (©Fold↔ (©r LDone ∧ LRoom))
“Fold if and only if the Laundry is Done and you are in the LRoom”
3. ♦(Bedroom)
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“Visit the Bedroom”
While one may choose to analyze the robot behavior with respect to the specifica-
tions used for the controller synthesis, one is not necessarily restricted to those LTL
formulas. The above specifications were selected to illustrate several properties of the
system, and, while the first two properties are part of the specification used to synthesize
the controller, the third property was not. This property is included to asses the extent
to which the robot explores the workspace before ending its task.
Using the parametric model checking algorithm described earlier, we find a symbolic
formula for the probability of satisfying each property, as a function of the environment
event frequency and sensor accuracy. For the following results, the values of fMess00,
fMess11, and fLDone00 were set at 0.75, 0.5, and 0.95, respectively. For the results in
Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.8, the value of aMess (accuracy of Mess sensor) was held at 0.75.
For Figure 2.8, the value of aLDone (accuracy of LDone sensor) was fixed at 0.95.
Using a 2.53 GHz computer with 4.00 GB of RAM, the DTMC for the complete sys-
tem was composed in 0.55 seconds, while the parametric model checking for the DTMC
took 3.67, 1.07, and 0.29 seconds for the three properties (given in order). Each para-
metric formula was then written to a function, allowing for easy evaluation for differing
values of the parameters in MATLAB (evaluation of the formula for the first property
requires roughly 0.04 seconds). By contrast, a single valuation of the first property is
PRISM takes only 0.38 seconds; the drawback being that a full re-evaluation is required
for each new set of values for the parameters.
Non-monotonic performance: Figure 2.5 shows the performance of the controller
over a range of values for aLDone. We see that the probability of satisfying the third
specification does not monotonically increase or decrease with respect to changes in the
accuracy of s LDone. Rather, it has a minimum at a sensor accuracy of approximately
0.38. This behavior is caused by the complex interactions between the dynamics of
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Figure 2.5: Plot of the probability with which each of the properties is satisfied for a
range of LDone sensor accuracies, evaluated at steps of 0.01.
the system (environment frequencies and robot actions) and the sensing (sensor accu-
racies); the specification is satisfied when s LDone remains false long enough that the
robot reaches the Bedroom. This can occur when r LDone immediately becomes true
and s LDone remains false, accounting for the small peak at very low sensor accura-
cies. Alternately, this can occur when r LDone remains false and s LDone correctly
mimics it, accounting for the peak at high values of aLDone. At intermediate accura-
cies, s LDone is more likely to become true (either correctly or incorrectly), causing the
robot to go to LRoom before it reaches Bedroom.
Sensor effect on different specifications: Figure 2.5 also shows the effects of the
LDone sensor accuracy on the first and second specifications. We see that improvements
to the accuracy of the LDone sensor have a negative effect on the probability with which
the robot satisfies the first property, which does not depend directly on r LDone. This is
because, due to the low probability of r LDone becoming true, a lower sensor accuracy
is more likely to result in a value of true for s LDone, which causes the robot to return
to LRoom, where the value of Mess is fixed as false, so no errors are made. The second
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specification is directly influenced by the LDone sensor, and improves as s LDone be-
comes more accurate. A comparison of the two properties shows that a sensor accuracy
of about 0.65 would be desired for equal performance of the controller with regards to
each of the two specifications.
Bounded Analysis: Figure 2.6 shows the same analysis performed for a time bound
of 15 discrete time steps, with the unbounded results shown as thinner lines, for com-
parison. The bounded analysis shows similar results to the unbounded analysis. The
first specification shows very little change for the analyzed time-bound, since, once the
s LDone sensor becomes true, the specification will be satisfied, regardless of the time
bound. The second specification shows improved performance in intermediate sensor
accuracy ranges, owing to the possibility that the robot does not sense s LDone before
the end of the time bound. Finally, the probability of satisfying the third specification
decreased, as the bounded time-frame reduces the chances that the robot will visit the
Bedroom when influenced by repeated readings of s Mess. One noticeable point is that
the safety conditions (specifications 1 and 2) improved under the bounded execution,
while the probability of satisfying the liveness condition (specification 3) decreased;
this is expected due to the relationship between the two types of formulas (as discussed
in Section 2.4.2), where the probability P (ϕ) = 1− P (♦¬ϕ).
Picking sensor accuracies: If we wish to find the sensor accuracies needed for
the robot to obtain a particular performance, it may be useful to look at the evaluation
of a function over ranges of multiple sensors. Figure 2.7 shows a surface plot of the
weighted average of all three specifications, with the added requirements that the first
and second specifications maintain a probability greater than 0.25. The three specifi-
cations are weighted by 9, 2, and 5, respectively. This plot shows that, while the best
performance results from high accuracies for both sensors, if the Mess sensor is inaccu-
rate, a highly accurate LDone sensor may result in undesirable behavior (i.e. a point that
27
Figure 2.6: Plot of the probability with which each of the properties is satisfied for
a range of LDone sensor accuracies, evaluated for a time-bound of 15 discrete steps.
For comparison, the unbounded results are shown as the corresponding faint lines. The
probability is evaluated at steps of 0.01.
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Figure 2.7: Plot of the surface representing the weighted average probability of the
three properties as a function of sensor accuracies for both the Mess and LDone sensors.
Additional requirements that the first and second properties have a probability greater
than 0.25 are imposed, constraining the surface. The probability is evaluated at steps of
0.01.
is not part of the surface, due to the constraints).
Environment frequency effects: Figure 2.8 shows the effects caused by chang-
ing the probability with which the environment proposition r LDone remains false (the
value of fLDone00, in Figure 2.3). We can see from this plot that, as the probability
with which r LDone remains false increases, the first and second specifications de-
crease while the third increases. This is because an increase in fLDone00 corresponds
to a lower probability that r LDone becomes true, which, due the high accuracy of the
LDone sensor (a LDone = 0.95), creates a lower probability that the robot will return
to LRoom. As discussed previously, a late return to LRoom decreases the probability
with which the robot satisfies the first and second specifications, while simultaneously
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Figure 2.8: Plot of the probability with which each of the properties is satisfied for a
range of probabilities with which the value of the environment proposition r LDone
remains false (fLDone00). The accuracy of the LDone sensor is fixed at 0.95, and the
probability is evaluated at steps of 0.01.
increasing the probability with which it will satisfy the third specification. The exponen-
tial decay of the probability that the second specification is satisfied can be attributed to
the rapid decrease in the probability that r LDone becomes true while, due to the fixed
accuracy of the LDone sensor, the probability of a false-positive reading of s LDone
remains the same. A false positive value for s LDone when the robot returns to LRoom
will cause the robot to violate the specification.
2.5.2 Example 2: Taxi
Scenario: The second example we present is that of an autonomous Taxi. The robot
operates in a 9-block grid of roads and intersections, with a single parking Lot. The
discretized workspace, which has 41 different regions, is shown in Figure 2.9. The robot
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Figure 2.9: Workspace for the example of a an autonomous Taxi. Roads are indicated
by names beginning with R, while intersections are indicated by names beginning with
I.
is tasked to continually visit each of the roads and, when it senses a Person, pick them
up, activating the action Passenger. Once Passenger is activated, the taxi is required to
take them to the Lot and drop them off. While doing this, the robot is required to Stop
for any RedLights it senses. The final sensor the robot has is used to detect when the lot
is Full; once it is sensed, the robot Parks and the task is complete.
Controller: The deterministic controller that is synthesized from the temporal logic
specifications has a total of 4,102 states. Composing this controller with the models of
the environment and sensors results in a probabilistic model of the system with 24,612
states. Due to the large number of states and transitions in the model, the current imple-
mentation of the parametric model checking algorithm introduced in Section 2.4 cannot
efficiently calculate the probabilities with which the controller satisfies a given set of
properties. As such, we use PRISM to analyze the performance of the controller. Due
to the substantially larger model for this example, evaluation takes significantly longer
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than for the first example; evaluating a single data point for one of the formulas required
238.54 seconds.
Environment: For this example, the environment is restricted in several ways.
Firstly, a Person will attempt to flag-down the taxi only while in Road regions. In those
regions, we define the appearance of a person as having a 0.2 probability of being true.
The second is that only the intersections contain stop lights and, therefore, r RedLight
can be true only at intersections; we model it such that it has a 0.5 chance of becoming
true when previously false, and a 0.75 chance of remaining true (approximating the ten-
dency of stoplights to remain red for a short duration). The final restriction we place on
the environment is that r Full has a 0.1 chance of becoming true, after which it remains
true.
For the situation in which the transition probabilities for the environment are un-
known, we model the system as an MDP, in which the environment transitions are non-
deterministic, and the sensor transitions remain probabilistic. Such a model allows us to
use PRISM to analyze the minimum and maximum probabilities with which the system
will satisfy the specifications.
Sensors: In each of the states where the sensor values were not restricted by the as-
sumptions placed on the environment, the sensors were modeled such that they correctly
mimicked the corresponding environment proposition with a predefined probability. For
the following analysis, each of the sensors that were not being varied were held fixed
at accuracies of 0.9 and 0.75 for the s Full and s Person sensors, respectively. The
s RedLight sensor accuracy was held at a value of 0.85 in all of the intersections, with
the exception of intersections I02, I08, and I1. For these intersections, the sensor had a
lower accuracy, held constant at 0.7, approximating intersections with poor visibility.
Analysis properties: We analyze the performance of the controller with respect to
the two properties listed below.
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1. (r RedLight↔ Stop)
“Stop at any and all RedLights”
2. (Park → ¬Passenger)
“No Passengers when Parking”
Unrealizable specification: The second property, which requires that the robot
never have a Passenger when it Parks, is interesting because it can not be included
in the controller specification, as it is un-synthesizeable (i.e. a controller cannot be gen-
erated). We cannot guarantee that, even if the sensors are perfect, the controller will
always satisfy this specification. If we analyze the specification under perfect sensor
accuracies we find that the controller has a 0.625 probability of satisfying the specifica-
tion. In contrast, analysis of the first property, which is part of the specification, shows
1.0 probability of satisfaction under perfect sensor accuracies.
Discontinuities in the probability: Figure 2.10 shows the results of analyzing the
properties over variations in the accuracy of s Full. The second specification shown
in this figure has a discontinuous data point at an accuracy of 0, where the sensor will
always have the wrong reading for the Full proposition. As a result, s Full will always
be true if the first r Full environment value is false (once the sensor turns true it remains
so, as part of the assumptions). Alternately, if r Full becomes true immediately, the
sensor will continually be false. For the former case, the taxi will park before picking
up a passenger, guaranteeing that the specification will be satisfied. For the latter case,
the taxi will never park, again guaranteeing that the specification will be satisfied. At
sensor accuracies greater than 0, the latter of the two cases will no longer hold, and the
sensor will eventually become true, accounting for the discontinuity.
MDP analysis: For the situation in which the environment frequencies are unknown,
we can model the system as an MDP, and obtain the minimum and maximum probabil-
ities with which our controller will satisfy the specifications. Figure 2.11 shows the
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Figure 2.10: Plot of the performance of the autonomous Taxi, over a range of different
sensor accuracies for the Full sensor.
result of such an analysis for the minimum and maximum probability with which the
robot will always Stop if and only if it is at a RedLight (shown as the shaded area). We
can see that, as would be expected, the probability found from the DTMC always lies
within the bounds of the MDP minimum and maximum (for the specification in ques-
tion). For this scenario, the resulting bounds nearly converge at a sensor accuracy of 0.5,
where the frequency of r Full does not affect the probability that s Full becomes true (at
50% accuracy, the sensor behaves in a uniformly random fashion). The bounds do not
completely converge, however, due to the influence of the Person and RedLight sensors.
At s Full accuracies closer to 1 or 0, the gap between the upper and lower bounds is
larger, due to the influence of r Full. Because we have no information about the proba-
bility with which the environment changes, the lower bound correspond to an adversarial
environment, while the upper bound corresponds to a beneficial environment.
Adjusting the controller: Recognizing that the three intersections with lower Red-
Light sensor accuracy may adversely affect the performance of the robot, we can adjust
the controller by adding the specification ¬(©I02 ∨©I08 ∨©I10), which requires
that the robot always avoid these three regions. Analyzing this new controller under the
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Figure 2.11: The probability of satisfying (r RedLight ↔ Stop) under known en-
vironment probabilities (shown as a line with markers), as compared to the probability
bound obtained by analyzing the MDP for unknown environment transition probabilities
(shown by the shaded area).
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Table 2.1: Table of the results for adjusting the Taxi controller to avoid intersections
with poor accuracy for the RedLight sensor. Results are given for both specifications
with the original controller and the adjusted controller, as well as the difference caused
by adjusting the controller.
Bad Intersections (r RedLight↔ Stop) (Park → ¬Passenger)
Original Adjusted Difference Original Adjusted Difference
I02, I08, I10 0.6986 0.7004 0.0018 0.5964 0.5962 -0.0002
I01, I06, I08, I13, I15 0.4724 0.8787 0.4063 0.5335 0.4128 -0.1207
default model values (environment frequencies and sensor accuracies) yields the results
shown in the second row of Table 2.1. We can see from these results that the bad in-
tersections had negligible effect on the performance of the controller, due to the large
number of intersections and the relatively small impact of the poor accuracies in just
those three. If the set of bad intersections was composed of more significant regions, a
similar adjustment may yield more significant changes.
The third row of Table 2.1 shows the results for the original and an adjusted con-
troller when the intersections I01, I06, I08, I13, and I15 are the intersections with bad
sensor accuracies. The results of adjusting the controller to avoid these regions shows a
much more significant change. We see here that the first specification improves by more
than 40%, because the bad intersections (which the controller is adjusted to avoid) are
intersections that were used often by the original controller. For the second specifica-
tion, the significant drop in probability is due to the round-about path the vehicle needs
to take to avoid the bad intersections; taking a longer route causes the vehicle to spend
more time with the passenger, increasing the probability that it has a passenger when it
parks.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel approach for assessing the performance of automat-
ically synthesized controllers under the presence of erroneous sensors. By composing
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a model of the system, including the behavior of the environment and sensors, we use
probabilistic model checking techniques to compute the probability with which the con-
troller will satisfy a set of high-level specifications. In the case of a partially known
model of the environment or sensors, where one or more event frequencies or sensor ac-
curacies are unknown, the model can be defined as an MDP, and upper and lower bounds
can be found for the probability with which the robot will satisfy the specifications.
We discuss the calculation of parametric formulas representing the satisfaction prob-
ability as a function of the model parameters (frequency of environment changes and
sensor accuracies). The algorithms presented in this paper allow for the inclusion of
time bounds and the nesting of a single “next” temporal operator in the analyzed for-
mulas. The applicability of this approach is presented with reference to two different
examples.
The work presented here facilitates the assessment and redesign of a controller syn-
thesized from temporal logic specifications and provides a foundation for further related
work. In the future, we intend to extend the applicability of this approach to include ac-
tuation uncertainty in the assessment of controller performance; the primary challenge
in such an extension lies in the creation of states that, due to unintended changes in the
robot propositions, were not part of the synthesized controller. Such states require care-
ful handling, especially as we consider such questions as the robot’s ability to observe its
own state. Additionally, we intend to incorporate such analysis into the automated selec-
tion and synthesis of the controller, allowing for the automatic synthesis of controllers
that are robust to errors in the robot’s sensors and actuators.
CHAPTER 3
ANALYZING AND REVISING SYNTHESIZED CONTROLLERS FOR
ROBOTS WITH SENSING AND ACTUATION ERRORS
3.1 Introduction
Recent research in the fields of robotics and automation has adapted techniques from
the formal methods community to enable the synthesis of correct-by-construction robot
controllers for complex tasks [8, 17, 34–36, 44, 56]. Such techniques take a specification
of the desired robot behavior, and create an abstract controller that is guaranteed to
satisfy those specifications (if such a controller exists). Doing so offers a number of
advantages over a more traditional controller design process:
• Synthesis lowers the level of technical expertise required to design and build a
controller for a complex task by abstracting away many lower-level details and
avoiding traditional programming languages.
• Synthesis reduces the time investment typically required to implement a robot
controller by allowing the designer to create and edit the controller directly from
the task specification.
• Synthesis techniques also typically offer guarantees on the behavior of the robot
with respect to the specified task; such guarantees ease the burden of validation
and testing of the controller.
Research on the synthesis of robot controllers has led to a number of different ap-
proaches, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. In [16] and [61], for exam-
ple, the proposed methods use feedback controllers to control the motion of the robot,
while in [4] and [32] the authors sacrifice completeness and use sampling-based methods
for robots with more complex dynamics. In [34] and [32] the authors use synthesized
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controllers to complete complex motion tasks in static environments, while in [37] and
[62], by contrast, the authors synthesize controllers that react to dynamic events in the
environment.
Each of these proposed approaches provides some guarantee on the execution of the
synthesized controller. The approach in [37], for example, synthesizes a controller in
such a way that it is guaranteed to satisfy all of the underlying specifications, if one as-
sumes that the abstract sensors and actuators operate without error. Such an assumption
is, however, typically infeasible in real-world scenarios. As such, it is important to pro-
vide guarantees that account for the errors and uncertainties that occur when operating
in complex, real-world environments.
In [34], the authors present an approach for generating a feedback control strategy
from Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) specifications in such a way that all closed-loop
trajectories for the controller will satisfy the specification, despite disturbances in the
continuous system. In [42] and [43], the authors extend that work by modeling the un-
certainty on the outcomes of the low-level motion primitives, and altering the synthesis
algorithm such that it generates the motion plan that has the highest probability of satis-
fying the specification. In [11] the authors improve the computational feasibility of the
approach via dynamic programming, and in [46] the authors present a method to max-
imize the probability of satisfying a specification within a specific time bound. In [10]
the authors allow for time-varying observations of the robot’s environment, and generate
a controller which maximizes the probability that the robot satisfies some specification
(which may be reactive with respect to those observations). In [45], the authors present
a Process Algebra based method for probabilistically validating robot mission software
in an uncertain environment, described by random variables.
In [28] and [29], the authors assess the impact of errors in the robot’s perception
of the environment. In these papers, they create sensor propositions which, in the error
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free case, mimic the set of environment event propositions. By probabilistically model-
ing false positives and false negatives, they include the probability of erroneous sensor
values in a discrete model of the overall system. They then use probabilistic model
checking techniques to compute the probability that the robot satisfies some set of LTL
formulas, and use the analysis to inform design choices for the synthesized controller.
They apply this approach to the scenario of an autonomous car in [27].
Similarly, in [30], the authors model errors in the robot’s actuation by the inclusion
of probabilistic transitions to unintended states. Again, a discrete, probabilistic model of
the system is created, and a probabilistic model checker is used to compute the probabil-
ity that the robot satisfies some set of LTL formulas. The paper then extends the analysis
by providing a preliminary method for the automatic determination of revisions to the
original specification that may result in a controller with a higher likelihood of satisfying
the given task. This process of computing specification revisions for the user provides
a valuable tool in the design of synthesized robot controllers, as it provides the designer
with important feedback to improve the probability that the robot exhibits a particular
behavior. Furthermore, by including the designer in the feedback loop (i.e. returning
the suggested revision to the user, rather than automatically including it in the specifica-
tion and re-synthesizing), the process helps to prevent the emergence of unexpected or
unwanted behavior from the generated revisions.
The generation of revisions for controller synthesis is, at this point, largely unex-
plored. In a recent paper, [7] present a method for the supervised synthesis of and
revision of a motion control policy for a Dubins vehicle, where the control policy is
synthesized from a PCTL specification. Furthermore, the algorithms provide the user
with suggestions for specification relaxation in order to improve the performance of the
robot. Other related work in the literature is that of [33] and [15]. In these papers, the
authors present approaches for revising an unsynthesizable temporal logic specification
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by relaxing the restrictions on the initial condition of the robot in such a way that the
specification becomes synthesizable. In [52], the authors describe techniques for auto-
matically generating a concise explanation for an unsynthesizable LTL specification; the
approach provides feedback to the user to aid in debugging the specification and enable
the synthesis of a feasible robot controller.
The work presented in this paper builds upon the authors’ earlier work in [28], [29],
and [30]. First, this paper discusses composition and analysis of a probabilistic model of
the system, which includes both sensor and actuator error. The simultaneous considera-
tion of both sensor and actuator error, which is necessary in real-world applications, re-
quires significant adaptations of the composition algorithms presented in [29] and [30];
the new algorithms, and the required adaptations are detailed in Section 3.4. Addition-
ally, this paper expands on the preliminary approach described in [30] for automatically
generating revision suggestions for the original specification. This paper presents an
improvement to the revision algorithm described in the authors’ earlier work, as well as
presenting three additional methods for generating complimentary revision suggestions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents some necessary background
information, and Section 3.3 formally defines the problem statement. Sections 3.4 and
3.5 detail the methods for modeling and analyzing the controllers and for generating
revision suggestions. The approach is illustrated by an example in Section 3.6. Con-
cluding remarks are given in Section 3.7.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a logical formalism which allows for the expression
of linear-time temporal properties. An LTL formula φ is defined over a set of Boolean
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propositions Π. The syntax for a formula φ is defined recursively in Equation 3.1.
φ ::= true | pi ∈ Π | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | © φ | φUφ (3.1)
The semantics of an LTL formula is defined over an infinite sequence of states σ,
where a state σi, which occurs at time i in the sequence, is a set of truth assignments to
the atomic propositions pi ∈ Π. A state σi satisfies an LTL formula (denoted by σi  φ)
as given in Equation 3.2. A sequence of states σ is said to satisfy a formula φ if, for all
initial states σ0, σ0  φ.
σi  pi iff pi ∈ σi
σi  ¬φ iff σi 2 φ
σi  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff σi  φ1 and σi  φ2
σi ©φ iff σi+1  φ
σi  φ1 U φ2 iff ∃k | k ≥ i s.t. σk  φ2
and ∀j | i ≤ j < k : σj  φ1
(3.2)
Intuitively, the formula ©φ is true when φ holds true in the next state in the se-
quence, and φ1 U φ2 is true when the formula φ1 holds until φ2 becomes true (and φ2
becomes true at some point). Additional common operators can be derived from the
operators in Equation 3.1. The disjunction operator (∨) can be defined from the nega-
tion (¬) and conjunction (∧) operators, as can implication (→) and bi-conditional (↔).
Additionally, the temporal operators for eventualy (♦) and always () can be defined
using the until (U) operator. More details on the syntax and semantics of LTL can be
found in [14].
3.2.2 Controller Synthesis
The synthesized controllers used in this work were created using the approach described
in [37]. That approach requires a set of propositions X that model abstract events in
42
the environment, which the robot must observe and react to; similarly, the state and
actions of the robot are described by a set of abstract propositions Y , which includes
propositions to track the location of the robot in a discretized workspace.
The desired task for the robot is then described by an LTL formula that is restricted to
the General Reactivity (1) class of formulas, as described in [51]. This class of formulas
takes the form given in Equation 3.3.
φ = (ϕei ∧ ϕet ∧ ϕeg)→ (ϕsi ∧ ϕst ∧ ϕsg) (3.3)
In the above formula, the specification for the robot is given as a desired robot be-
havior (defined by ϕsi,t,g) in response to changes in the environment (defined by ϕ
e
i,t,g).
The formulas ϕei and ϕ
s
i are defined as Boolean formulas Bi over X ∪ Y , and represent
the initial conditions of the environment and robot, respectively. The formulas ϕet and
ϕst are of the form Bt, where Bt is a Boolean formula over X ∪ Y ∪©X ∪©Y , and
represent the restrictions on the possible transitions that the environment and robot can
make, often referred to as safety specifications. Finally, the formulas ϕeg and ϕ
s
g take the
form♦Bg, whereBg is a Boolean formula defined over X ∪Y , and represent the goals
of the environment and robot; they are referred to as fairness and liveness conditions,
respectively.
From the abstracted environment X and robot Y propositions, as well as the task
specification φ, a controller is synthesized using the approach described in [51]. The
synthesized controller takes the form of a finite-state automatonA= {S, S0,X ,Y , δ, L},
where S is the set of states, and S0 ⊆ S is the set of possible initial states. X and Y
are the environment and robot propositions, as described above. δ : S × 2X → S is
a transition function which maps a state and set of environment (input) propositions to
a successor state, and L : S → 2Y is a labeling function which maps each state to a
subset of the robot propositions Y . As additional information, the synthesis algorithm
can provide a function X0 : S0 → 2X which maps initial states to sets of environment
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propositions, and a ranking function Γ : S → N which maps each state to the index of
the liveness condition that state is working towards completing.
3.2.3 Probabilistic Model Checking
A number of different options exist for performing probabilistic model checking, de-
pending on the type of model and the type of properties to be checked. The work in
this paper relies on model checking a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) model
against one or more LTL properties. The probabilistic model is defined as a DTMC
D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π,L,Γ}, where Q is the set of states and Q0 ⊆ Q is the set of initial
states. The transition function ∆ : Q× p→ Q maps one state to another, with probabil-
ity p. The labeling function L : Q→ 2Π maps each state to a subset of the propositions
Π, and the ranking function Γ : Q→ Nmaps each state to the index of its corresponding
liveness condition.
While a number of different algorithms and off-the-shelf model checkers exist, the
work presented in this paper uses PRISM probabilistic model checker [38], which offers,
among other capabilities, the ability to compute the probability that a DTMC satisfies a
particular LTL formula, and is available online.
3.3 Problem Statement
The work presented in this paper considers correct-by-construction controllers such that,
when the robot’s sensors and actuators operate without error, the controller is guaranteed
to satisfy all of its underlying specifications. This paper investigates the affects of errors
in sensing and actuation on the behavior of the robot, and the revision of the controller
to improve the behavior of the robot under those erroneous conditions. To include these
effects, the behavior of the environment, sensors, and actuation of the robot are all be
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defined probabilistically.
The changes in the environment are described by a set of probabilities P (X ′ |X, Y )
that represent the changes in the abstract environment propositions X . In this set of
probabilities, each new environment configuration X ′ ⊆ X (that is, the subset of en-
vironment propositions that are true in the next step) is modeled to depend only on the
previous configuration of the environment X ⊆ X (the subset of environment proposi-
tions that are true in the current step) and the previous configuration of the environment
Y ⊆ Y (the subset of robot propositions that are true in the current step).
To model the sensors, an additional set of propositions X is used to represent the
robot’s perception of the environment propositions such that X = {xi |xi ∈ X}. The
evolution of the sensor propositions is given by the set of probabilities P (X ′ |X ′, X, Y ),
such that the new sensor configuration X ′ is dependent only on the new environment
configuration X ′ and the current sensor and robot configurations, X and Y respectively.
In this model, the sensor error is represented through false positives (where x′i = true
and x′i = false) and false negatives (where x′i = false and x
′
i = true) in how the
sensor propositions mimic the environment propositions.
To model the actuation error, changes in the robot configuration are modeled by the
set of probabilities P (Y ′ |Y ′, Y ), where the new robot configuration Y ′ is dependent
only on the previous robot configuration Y and the intended next robot configuration
Y ′. This model accounts for actuation error through differences between the intended
next robot configuration Y ′ (as determined by the synthesized controller) and the actual
configuration Y ′ that results from attempting to make that transition.
Each of these sets of probabilities (for the environment, sensors, and robot actuation)
can be estimated using statistical data gathered from experiments or simulations. In [43],
for example, the authors use experimental data to determine the probabilistic outcomes
of different motion primitives during the operation of their robot. Similarly, in [27] the
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of the approach used to compose and analyze a probabilistic model
of the robot, including the effects of sensor and actuator error
authors use statistical information gathered from a simulation to model the changes in
the abstracted environment and sensors for an autonomous vehicle.
Problem: Given a synthesized robot controller A and probabilistic models of the
environment P (X ′ |X, Y ), imperfect sensors P (X ′ |X ′, X, Y ), and imperfect robot ac-
tuation P (Y ′ |Y ′, Y ), find the probability that a robot using the synthesized controller
will satisfy a set of LTL specifications. Furthermore, provide revision suggestions to the
user to improve the probability that the robot satisfies the specifications.
3.4 Modeling and Analysis
An overview of the approach presented in this paper for composing and analyzing a
model of the robot with sensor and actuator error is shown in Figure 3.1. The model of
the probabilistic system is composed from the synthesized controller and probabilistic
models of the environment, sensors, and actuation, it is then analyzed with a probabilis-
tic model checker to calculate the likelihood that the robot will satisfy a given set of task
specifications.
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3.4.1 Sensor Error
Algorithm 6 describes the process of composing the environment probabilities and sen-
sor error with the synthesized controller to create a probabilistic model of the system
with imperfect sensors. This algorithm is a modified version of the one given in [29],
and has been changed to facilitate the integration of actuator error by including the cor-
respondence between each probabilistic state and its originating automaton state. Addi-
tionally, the algorithm was changed such that it creates new probabilistic states for any
transition with probability greater than zero, and includes transitions to deadlock states
and states which correspond to unconnected automaton states. This change allows for
arbitrary probabilistic models of the sensors (of the form P (X ′|X ′, X, Y )), instead of
requiring that the sensor model adhere to any environmental assumptions, as was the
case in [29].
Algorithm 6 takes as input the synthesized automaton A, the set of initial environ-
ment configurations X0, the controller’s ranking function Γ, the set of sensor propo-
sitions X , and probabilistic models of the environment and sensors, P (X ′|X, Y ) and
P (X ′|X ′, X, Y ), respectively. The output of this algorithm is the probabilistic modelD
of the system with sensor error, and a function Λ : Q→ S which maps each state in the
probabilistic model to it’s originating state in the synthesized automaton. The resulting
probabilistic model D includes transitions to incorrect states in the automaton as well
as to states that were not in the synthesized controller, due to false positives and false
negatives in the robot’s sensor propositions.
Consider a scenario where a robot is required to pass from one room to another
through a doorway which may be either closed or open. The synthesized automaton,
then, would include a state where the robot moves through the open door, and one where
the robot waits at the closed door. In including the sensor error, Algorithm 6 would
model not only if the door was open but also if the robot sensed that the door was
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open. The algorithm would create new states that include both the senor values and the
state of the environment, and add transitions based on the specified probabilities. As a
result, the model would include transitions to a state where the robot attempts to drive
through a closed door (which it erroneously senses is open) and to a state where the
robot mistakenly waits for the open door (which it senses is closed) to open, as well as
to the correct states where it drives through the open door or waits for the closed door to
open.
Intuitively, the algorithm loops through each state in the automaton (line 3), and
extracts the set of propositions for the sensors, which correspond to the incoming tran-
sitions (lines 4-8). The algorithm then adds a new state to the probabilistic system,
labeled with the environment-sensor-robot configuration, and with the appropriate rank
and automaton mappings (lines 9-12). As each state is created, it is added to the set Q∗
of states for which the outgoing transitions are undefined (line 11). If the corresponding
automaton state was an initial state, it is also added to the set of initial states for the
probabilistic system (line 6).
While there are states in the set Q∗, the algorithm selects one (qi ∈ Q∗) and removes
it from the set (lines 13-14). It then extracts the appropriate labels for the environment,
sensors, and robot, at that state (line 15). Lines 16 and 17 then loop through each allow-
able configuration of the environment and sensors, and the probability of transitioning
to those configurations is calculated in Line 18.
If there exists some state sk in the synthesized automaton such that there is a transi-
tion from si to sk that is labeled with the given sensor valuesXk, the robot configuration
is extracted from that state, and a transition is created to the appropriate state in the prob-
abilistic system (lines 19-20). If a state qjk with the appropriate labels exists, and that
state corresponds to the automaton state sk, a transition is created to it (lines 21-22); if
no such state already exists, a new state is created and added to the set of states missing
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Algorithm 6 Include sensor error in the system model.
1: procedure SENSERR(A = {S, S0,X ,Y, δ, L}, X0,Γ,X , P (X ′|X,Y ), P (X ′|X ′, X, Y ))
2: Q = ∅, Q0 = ∅, Q∗ = ∅, ∆ = ∅, Λ = ∅, Γq = ∅
3: for si ∈ S do
4: if si ∈ S0 then
5: Xi = X0(si)
6: Q0 = Q0 ∪ qi
7: else
8: Xi ⊆ X s.t. ∃sh ∈ S | (sh, Xi, si) ∈ δ
9: Xi = Xi, Yi = L(si)
10: L(qi) = Xi ∪Xi ∪ Yi
11: Q = Q ∪ qi, Q∗ = Q∗ ∪ qi
12: Λ(qi) = si, Γq(qi) = Γ(si)
13: while Q∗ 6= ∅ do
14: Choose qi ∈ Q∗, Q∗ = Q∗ \ qi
15: si = Λ(qi), Xi = L(qi) ∩ X , Xi = L(qi) ∩ X , Yi = L(qi) ∩ Y
16: for Xj ∈ 2X s.t. p(Xj |Xh, Yi) > 0 do
17: for Xk ∈ 2X s.t. p(Xk|Xj , Xi, Yi) > 0 do
18: pijk = p(Xj |Xi, Yi) · p(Xk|Xj , Xi, Yi)
19: if ∃sk ∈ S s.t. (si, Xk, sk) ∈ δ then
20: Yk = L(sk)
21: if ∃qjk ∈ Q s.t. L(qjk) = Xj ∪Xk ∪ Yk and Λ(qjk) = sk then
22: ∆ = ∆ ∪ (qi, pijk, qjk)
23: else
24: L(qjk) = Xj ∪Xk ∪ Yk
25: Q = Q ∪ qjk, Q∗ = Q∗ ∪ qjk
26: Λ(qjk) = sk, Γq(qjk) = Γ(sk)
27: ∆ = ∆ ∪ (qi, pijk, qjk)
28: else if ∃sh, sk ∈ S s.t. L(sh) = L(si) and (sh, Xk, sk) ∈ δ then
29: (s∗h, s
∗
k) = argmin(sh,sk)((Γ(si)− Γ(sh)) modulo maxs∈S(Γ(s)))
30: if ∃qjk ∈ Q s.t. L(qjk) = Xj ∪Xk ∪ Yk and Λ(qjk) = s∗k then
31: ∆ = ∆ ∪ (qi, pijk, qjk)
32: else
33: L(qjk) = Xj ∪Xk ∪ Yk
34: Q = Q ∪ qjk, Q∗ = Q∗ ∪ qjk
35: Λ(qjk) = s∗k, Γq(qjk) = Γ(s
∗
k)
36: ∆ = ∆ ∪ (qi, pijk, qjk)
37: else
38: Yk = Yi
39: L(qjk) = Xj ∪Xk ∪ Yk
40: Q = Q ∪ qjk
41: Λ(qjk) = None, Γq(qjk) = Γq(qi)
42: ∆ = ∆ ∪ (qi, pijk, qjk) ∪ (qjk, 1, qjk)
43: return D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π = X ∪ X ∪ Y,L,Γq},Λ
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outgoing transitions Q∗, and the appropriate transition is created in ∆ (lines 23-27)
If there is no appropriate transition in the synthesized automaton (out of si), then the
algorithm looks for an identically labeled transition out of another state which shares the
same configuration as si (line 28). If any such states exist, the algorithm takes the one
with the most closely preceding goal rank (line 29), and creates the appropriate transi-
tion. Again, if the destination state is already in the probabilistic system, the algorithm
adds a transition to it (lines 30-31); if no such state exists, a new one is created and
added to the set Q∗ (lines 32-36).
Finally, if there are no transitions in the synthesized automaton which match the
considered labels, a sink state (with no outgoing transitions) is created, and a transition
is added to that state (lines 37-42).
3.4.2 Actuator Error
Algorithm 7 describes a similar process, which introduces the actuation error into the
probabilistic model. This algorithm is adapted from the one presented in [30], and is
slightly modified to incorporate the actuation error into an existing DTMC, rather than
creating a probabilistic model from the synthesized automaton. These modifications
enable the algorithm to account for sensor configurations (in addition to environment
and robot configurations), and to include the probabilities that were computed for each
transition in Algorithm 6.
The inputs to the algorithm are the DTMC D of the probabilistic model with sensor
error (from Algorithm 6), the sets of environment X , sensor X , and robot Y proposi-
tions, the function Λ which maps states in D to states in A, and the probabilistic model
of the actuation error P (Y ′|Y ′, Y ). The outputs of the algorithm are the adjusted prob-
abilistic model D, which includes actuation error in addition to sensor error, and the
expanded automaton-state mapping function Λ. The new probabilistic model includes
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new states and new transitions that are a result of unintended changes in the state of the
robot.
Consider, again, the scenario where a robot is required to pass through a doorway,
when open. The probabilistic model that results from Algorithm 7 would now include
the possibility of the robot attempting and failing to exit through the door when it senses
that it is open. This involves the creation of new states, in which the robot attempts and
fails to move through a doorway it senses to be open. If such states are not planned for
in the automaton, they result in deadlock states in the probabilistic model (no outgoing
transitions).
Algorithm 7 Include actuation error in the model.
1: procedure ACTERR(D = {Q,Q0,∆,Π,L,Γq},X ,X ,Y , Λ, P (Y ′|Y ′, Y ))
2: ∆Act = ∅
3: for (qi, pij, qj) ∈ ∆ do
4: Xi = L(qi) ∩ X , Xi = L(qi) ∩ X , Yi = L(qi) ∩ Y
5: Xj = L(qj) ∩ X , Xj = L(qj) ∩ X , Yj = L(qj) ∩ Y
6: for Yk ∈ 2Y s.t. p(Yk|Yj, Yi) > 0 do
7: if Yk = Yj then
8: ∆Act = ∆Act ∪ (qi, pij · p(Yk|Yj, Yi), qj)
9: else if ∃(qh, qk) ∈ Q×Q s.t. (qh, phk, qk) ∈ ∆
and L(qk) = Xj ∪Xj ∪ Yk then
10: ql = argminqk((Γq(qj)− Γq(qk)) modulo maxq∈Q(Γq(q)))
11: ∆Act = ∆Act ∪ (qi, phl · p(Yk|Yj, Yi), ql)
12: else
13: L(qjk) = Xj ∪Xj ∪ Yk
14: Q = Q ∪ qjk
15: Λ(qjk) = Λ(qj)
16: ∆Act = ∆Act ∪ (qi, pij · p(Yk|Yj, Yi), qjk)
17: ∆Act = ∆Act ∪ (qjk, 1, qjk)
18: return D = {Q,Q0,∆Act,Π,L,Γ},Λ
This algorithm proceeds by looping through each transition in the input DTMC (line
3) and extracting the propositions associated with each state in the transition (lines 4-5).
It then loops through each robot configuration that is a possible outcome of the attempted
transition (line 6) and, if that outcome is the intended one, it adjusts the probability of
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the transition according to the actuation error model, and stores the transition in the new
transition function ∆Act (lines 7-8). Otherwise, if the outcome is not the intended one,
but matches another state in the system, a new transition is created to the matching state
with the most closely preceding goal (lines 9-11). Finally, if no such state exists in the
system, a new one is created and added to the system (lines 12-16); additionally, this
new state is set to be a sink state, which transitions to itself with probability 1 (line 17).
3.4.3 Model Analysis
The model D that is the output of Algorithm 7 is a discrete-time model which describes
the probabilistic behavior of the robot which is controlled by the synthesized automaton
A, and operating with imperfect sensors and actuators. This model can be analyzed with
respect to various LTL formulas as described in [28], [29], and [30]. These formulas may
be any valid LTL formula describing the behavior of the robot, and are not restricted
to the original task specification. Typically, these formulas are used to compute the
probability that the robot exhibits a particular behavior in response to changes in the
robot’s environment.
As in the previous papers, PRISM probabilistic model checker [38] was used to
find the probabilities used for the analysis presented in Section 3.6. It was also used
to perform the model-checking functionality in Algorithms 8-11. The PRISM model
checking software is available online at http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/.
3.5 Revision Suggestion
An overview of the presented approach for generating revision suggestions is shown in
Figure 3.2. After composing a probabilistic model of the system, as described in Sec-
tion 3.4, the model is analyzed with a probabilistic model checker, and used to provide
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of the presented approach for providing feedback to the user in
the form of an additional safety specification, a restriction on the initial condition, a
low-level component to refine, or a liveness specification to remove.
feedback to the user in the form of an additional safety specification, a restriction on the
initial condition, a low-level component to refine, or a liveness specification to remove.
3.5.1 Safety Specification Revisions
Algorithm 8 describes the process used to provide specification revisions in the form of
additional safety formulas (ϕst ) to be added to the original task specification. The inputs
to the algorithm are the probabilistic system D, a formula φ, and a maximum number of
steps to checkNmax. The formula φ is a Boolean formula overX∪Y∪©X∪©Y , which
represents a desired behavior for the robot (typically, this takes the form of a conjunction
of safety formulas, less the  operator). Nmax determines the maximum number of
steps ahead of each state the algorithm will check for violations of the specification φ;
the value of Nmax serves as a termination criterion for the for the algorithm in the case
that it is unable to find a suitable revision formula. The output of this algorithm is a
set of safety formulas Ψ which may be added to the original specification to modify the
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robot behavior.
Returning to the example scenario of a robot attempting to move through an open
door, consider a situation in which there are two doorways that lead out of the room. If
one of those doorways opens and closes more frequently, Algorithm 8 may detect that
attempting to move through that doorway is the most likely source of collisions with
a closed door, and return a revision suggestion that requires the robot to always avoid
using that particular doorway.
Algorithm 8 Suggest additional safety requirements.
1: procedure SAFETYREVS(D = {Q,Q0,∆,X ∪ X ∪ Y ,L, Γ}, φ,Nmax)
2: Qgoal = {q ∈ Q : Γ(q) 6= Γ(q′) ∀q′ s.t. (q, ·, q′) ∈ ∆}
3: Qdeadlock = {q ∈ Q : (q, 1, q) ∈ ∆}
4: Qcheck = Q \ (Q0 ∪Qgoal ∪Qdeadlock)
5: for N = 0 : Nmax do
6: Q∗ = ∅
7: for qi ∈ Qcheck do
8: Di = {Q, qi,∆,X ∪ X ∪ Y ,L, Γ}
9: ϕ = ¬φ ∧ t = N
10: p← MODELCHECK(Di, ϕ)
11: if p > 0 then
12: Q∗ = Q∗ ∪ (qi, p)
13: Y ′T = Y
′
F = Y ; X ′T = X ′F = X ; Ψ = ∅
14: while Q∗ 6= ∅ and Y ′T ∪ Y ′F 6= ∅ do
15: (qj, p) = argmax(qi,p)∈Q∗(p)
16: Y ′T = Y
′
T ∩ L(qj); Y ′F = Y ′F \ L(qj)
17: X ′T = X
′
T ∩ L(qj); X ′F = X ′F \ L(qj)
18: if Y ′T ∪ Y ′F 6= ∅ then
19: ψ = ((
∧
x∈X′T ©x ∧
∧
x∈X′F ¬© x)→ ¬(∧y∈Y ′T ©y ∧∧y∈Y ′F ¬© y))
20: if ψ /∈ Ψ then
21: Ψ = Ψ ∪ {ψ}
22: Q∗ = Q∗ \ (qj, p)
23: if Ψ 6= ∅ then
24: return Ψ
25: return ∅
The algorithm proceeds, first, by computing the set of goal states (where the robot
satisfies a liveness condition and begins working towards the next one, line 2), and the
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set of deadlock states (where the robot has no transitions out of that state, line 3). The
algorithm then reduces the set of states to check Qcheck (line 4) to only those states
that are not initial states (which are considered in Algorithm 9), goal states (which are
considered in Algorithm 11), or deadlock states (which are either sink states that are not
in the synthesized automaton, or are goal states).
Next, beginning with a value of N = 1, and increasing incrementally, the algorithm
loops through each state in the system (lines 5-7). It then sets the initial state of the
model to be the current state, and checks for the probability that the model violates φ
in exactly N steps (lines 8-10). If the calculated probability is non-zero, it adds the
state/probability pair to the list Q∗.
After this is completed for each state in the system, the algorithm initializes a set of
propositions to track which robot and environment propositions are true or false, in an
incrementally increasing set of states (line 13). It then loops through the state/probability
pairs in Q∗, and chooses the one with the highest probability of violating φ in N steps
(lines 14-15). In lines 16-17, the algorithm reduces each set of propositions to only those
propositions which match the value in the current state (i.e. a proposition is removed
from X ′T or Y
′
T if it is false in the current state, and removed from X
′
F or Y
′
F if it is true
in the current state). The resulting lists contain exactly the set of propositions that have
a consistent value (true or false) over every state that is pulled from the list Q∗.
After each set is reduced for the current state, if the set of robot propositions (either
true or false) are non-empty, a formula ψ = (©X ′ → ¬© Y ′) is created (lines 18-
19), such that if the environment propositions take the values stored in the lists X ′T and
X ′F , the robot is required to avoid the configuration stored in the lists Y
′
T and Y
′
F . If this
equation ψ is not already in the list of safety revisions Ψ, then it is added (lines 20-21).
The current state/probability pair is then removed from the list Q∗ (line 22), and the
algorithm continues the while-loop.
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After each value of N is checked, if one or more revisions has been found, the
algorithm returns the set of LTL formulas Ψ (lines 23-24). If no revisions have been
found for the current value of N , the algorithm increments the value and repeats the
process. If no results are found for any value 0 ≤ N ≤ Nmax, the algorithm terminates
with no revisions (line 25).
The set Ψ that is output by Algorithm 8 is a set of LTL safety formulas that may be
added to the original specification, to force the synthesized controller to avoid a certain
behavior that is exhibited by the set of state-pairs used to create the formula. The first
formula added to the set is the most specific (it corresponds to avoiding a single tran-
sition in the original automaton) and each subsequent formula becomes progressively
more general (corresponding to avoiding progressively larger sets of transitions).
3.5.2 Initial-State Revisions
Another type of automated feedback is described in Algorithm 9 which provides speci-
fication revisions in the form of restrictions on the initial configuration of the robot (ϕsi ).
The inputs to this algorithm are the probabilistic model of the system D and the LTL
formula φ describing the desired behavior of the robot. Unlike in Algorithm 8, this for-
mula is not restricted beyond being an LTL formula over the set of propositions X ∪ Y .
The output of Algorithm 9 is a Boolean formula ψ over the propositions in Y , which
describes the best initial configuration of the robot, from the set of possible initial states.
Algorithm 9 proceeds by looping through each initial state q0 ∈ Q0 and restriciting
the probabilistic system to only that initial state (lines 3-4). The algorithm then uses the
probabilistic model checker to find the probability that this restricted system satisfies the
desired behavior φ (line 5). This probability, along with the robot labels on the initial
state, are stored in the set P (lines 6-7). After this process is completed for each initial
state, the algorithm finds the stored pair with the highest average probability over all
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Algorithm 9 Suggest a restriction of the initial state.
1: procedure INITREVS(D = {Q,Q0,∆,X ∪ X ∪ Y ,L,Γ}, φ)
2: P = ∅
3: for q0 ∈ Q0 do
4: D0 = {Q, q0,∆,X ∪ Y ,L,Γ}
5: p← MODELCHECK(D0, φ)
6: l = L(q0) ∩ Y
7: P = P ∪ (p, l)
8: (p∗, l∗) = argmax(p,l)∈P
[
mean(p′,l′)∈P |l′=l(p′)
]
9: ψ =
∧
y∈l∗ y ∧
∧
y∈Y\l∗ ¬y
10: return ψ
elements in the set which share the same labels (line 8). These labels are then used
to create a Boolean formula ψ over the set of propositions Y which restricts the initial
robot configuration to a single set of values (line 9).
The formula ψ which is created by Algorithm 9 can be added to the set of specifica-
tions for the robot’s initial configuration ϕsi to improve the overall behavior of the robot
(with respect to the input formula φ), by restricting the initial state of the robot to the
single configuration that has the highest probability of satisfying φ. It should be noted
that this algorithm does not attempt to restrict the initial configuration of the environ-
ment, which is assumed to be outside of the user’s control. Furthermore, if the set of
initial states Q0 does not contain multiple states, with different robot configurations, in-
cluding ψ in the synthesis specifications will have no effect (as the initial configuration
is already restricted to that valuation).
3.5.3 Low-Level Component Revisions
The third type of automated revision presented in this paper is that of suggesting revi-
sions to a low-level component that is represented by one of the abstract propositions
that are used to represent the robot’s sensing or actuation. Algorithm 10 describes the
process used to perform a sensitivity analysis on the low-level components, and iden-
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tify the component (p(·) ∈ P (·) ⊆ P (X ′ |X ′, X, Y ) ∪ P (Y ′ |Y ′, Y )) for which the
robot is most sensitive to improvements in performance. The inputs to the algorithm are
the probabilistic system D, the desired behavior φ (which, like in Algorithm 9, can be
any LTL formula over the propositions in X ∪ Y), and the set of low-level component
probabilities to be analyzed P (·). The output of the algorithm is the single low-level
component p(·) ∈ P (·) which, if improved, would have the greatest improvement in the
behavior of the robot (with respect to φ).
Algorithm 10 Suggest revisions to the low-level components (abstract actuators and
sensors).
1: procedure HWREVS(D = {Q,Q0,∆,X ∪ X ∪ Y ,L,Γ}, φ, P (·))
2: p← MODELCHECK(D, φ)
3: Pδ = ∅
4: for p(·) ∈ P (·) do
5: ∆δ ← replace p(·) with p(·) + δ for all p(·) ∈ ∆
6: Dδ = {Q,Q0,∆δ,X ∪ Y ,L,Γ}
7: pδ ← MODELCHECK(Dδ, φ)
8: Pδ = Pδ ∪ (pδ, p(·))
9: (p∗δ , p(·)∗) = argmax(pδ,p(·))∈Pδ(pδ − p)
10: return p(·)∗
Algorithm 10 first finds the probability that the nominal model satisfies the input
formula φ (line 2). It then loops through each low-level component p(·) ∈ P (·) and
modifies the transition function in the original model by replacing each occurrence of
p(·) with a slightly higher value p(·) + δ, and adjust the other probabilities in ∆ accord-
ingly (lines 4-5). The system model is then adjusted for the new transition function, and
checked to find the probability that it satisfies the desired behavior φ (lines 6-7). The
probability, along with the component that was adjusted, is then stored in the set Pδ (line
8). Finally, the algorithm finds the probability/component pair with the largest increase
in probability (over the nominal), and returns that component to the user (lines 9-10).
The component probability that is returned by Algorithm 10 represents the single
actuation or sensing component that, if improved, would have the largest positive impact
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on the behavior of the robot (with respect to φ). This component could be improved
separately by the user, by making changes to the underlying abstraction or algorithms,
or by investing in more accurate hardware.
3.5.4 Liveness Condition Revisions
The final automated revision discussed in this paper is the identification of a specific
liveness condition from the set of liveness formulas (ϕsg), in pursuit of which the robot
is most likely to exhibit an undesirable behavior. Algorithm 11 describes this process,
where the inputs to the function are the probabilistic systemD, and the desired behavior
φ. As in Algorithm 8, the desired behavior φ is restricted to a Boolean formula over
X ∪ Y ∪ ©X ∪ ©Y . The output of this algorithm is the index γ∗ of the liveness
condition which is most likely to result in a violation of the desired behavior φ.
Algorithm 11 Suggest removal of liveness condition.
1: procedure LIVENESSREVS(D = {Q,Q0,∆,X ∪ X ∪ Y ,L, Γ}, φ)
2: Pg = zeros(Γmax)
3: for qj ∈ Q do
4: ϕ = φ U (!φ ∧©q = qj)
5: p← MODELCHECK(D, ϕ)
6: Pg[Γ(qj)] = Pg[Γ(qj)] + p
7: γ∗ = argmaxγ∈1:|Pg |(Pg[γ])
8: return γ∗
This algorithm begins by creating a set of probabilities (initialized to 0) to track
the probability that the robot violates φ while pursing each particular goal (line 2). It
then loops through each state qj in the system, and finds the probability that the first
time the robot violates φ is while transitioning to that state (lines 3-5). This value is
then added to stored value that corresponds to the goal being pursued in state qj (line
6). The algorithm then returns the goal index γ∗ that has the largest stored value for
the probability of causing the initial violation of φ (lines 7-8). Note that, because the
59
formula ϕ that is being analyzed finds the probability that each state is the first to violate
φ, the sum of all entries in Pg will be no greater than 1.
3.5.5 Notes on Revision Suggestions
Algorithms 8-11 describe four complimentary methods for providing feedback to the
user in the form of suggested changes to the task specification or low-level components.
It should be noted, however, that the suggested safety revisions (Algorithm 8) and the
suggested liveness revisions (Algorithm 11) are not guaranteed to result in an improve-
ment of the behavior of the robot. In each case, the suggested revision would alter
the behavior of the robot by prohibiting the current most problematic behavior or by
removing a behavior that leads to violation of the specifications. Synthesizing a new
controller with the suggested revision will change the behavior of the robot, and may be
probabilistically worse than the behavior being avoided by the revision. Additionally,
the addition of a new safety specification may even cause the overall specification to
become unsynthesizable.
It is also worth noting that the removal of a liveness condition represents a more
significant change in the original specification than the introduction of a safety specifi-
cation (Algorithm 8) or a restriction of the initial condition (Algorithm 9). In this case,
the revision causes a change in the task goals, and so must be handled with care. As
such, it is typically better to revise the controller as described in Sections 3.5.1-3.5.3
prior to removing a liveness condition from the original task specification. The dra-
matic impact of such a change also underlines the value of keeping the user involved in
the revision process, as an automation of this process would converge to a specification
without any liveness conditions, where the robot could easily satisfy the specifications
without needing to act.
Finally, it should be noted that one can easily automate the process of adding or
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removing specification revisions and synthesizing a new controller, which can be used
to create a new probabilistic model; the probabilistic performance of the new model can
than be assessed in comparison to the original model, to determine if the revision results
in an improvement in performance. This can then be used to automatically compare
and prioritize the different types of revisions and provide the user with only those which
provide a significant improvement in the behavior of the robot. The authors have, in
fact, implemented such functionality, though it is not discussed in detail in this paper.
In terms of computation, the most expensive part of each of these algorithms is that
of model checking a probabilistic model to find the probability that it satisfies an LTL
formula. Such LTL model checking is, in general, exponential in the size of the formula
and polynomial in the size of the given model [9]. As such, Algorithms 8 and 11 are
typically the most time consuming to run, as they usually require the most calls to the
“ModelCheck” function. Compared to model checking, the other calculations in each
of the algorithms have negligible computational costs.
3.6 Examples
Scenario: In this example, the robot is tasked with continuously visiting three different
regions (labeled G1, G2, and G3 in Figure 3.3), while avoiding an adversarial robot
that patrols the five regions in the middle of the map (R1-R5 in the figure). The robot
can (imperfectly) sense the location of the adversarial robot, and (imperfectly) move
between adjacent regions in the map.
A subset of the LTL formulas used to synthesize the controller are given below,
where ARi is an environment proposition describing the location of the adversary. The
first formula specifies that the adversary can only transition between adjacent regions,
while the second formula requires that the robot avoid being in the same region as the
adversary. The final equation specifies the goals for the robot: repeatedly visiting re-
61
Figure 3.3: Discretized map of the workspace for the example problem.
gions G1, G2, and G3.
• ∧i∈{1:5}(ARi → ∨j∈{i−1:i+1}©ARj)
• ∧i∈{1:5}(©ARi → ¬©Ri)
• ♦G1 ∧♦G2 ∧♦G3
The synthesized controller has 75 states, with the initial state of the robot being re-
stricted to G1, G2, or G3. When moving from G1 to G2, the robot traverses through
region R1 when the adversary is in regions R2-R5 and through region R2 when the
adversary is in region R1. When moving to and from G3, the robot waits until the
adversary traverses to R1 or R2 before entering regions R3-R5. If the sensing of the
adversary’s location and the movement of the robot both execute without failure, the
synthesized controller is guaranteed to satisfy the specified behavior; if the robot oper-
ates imperfectly, however, it may end up in the same region as the adversary, violating
the specification.
Probabilities: In this example, the movement of the adversarial is modeled such that
it as a 0.25 probability of staying in its current region on any step, and a 0.75 probability
of moving to one of the adjacent regions (split evenly among the adjacent regions). The
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Figure 3.4: Analysis results for the adversarial robot example: probability that the robot
avoids the adversary.
nominal model of the robot’s sensors and actuators are such that the robot has a 0.9
probability of correctly determining the location of the adversary (with the remaining
0.1 being split between the regions adjacent to the actual location of the adversary)
and a 0.9 probability of moving to the intended next region (with a 0.1 probability of
erroneously remaining in it’s current region).
Analysis: Figure 3.4 shows the resulting probability that the robot will avoid the
region with the adversary, over a time bound of 25 discrete transitions. The probability
that the robot correctly sensed the location of the adversary and the probability that the
robot moved to its intended next region were each independently varied between 0 and
1, and in each case the other probability was held constant at the nominal probability
of 0.9. The model was analyzed to find the probability that the robot satisfied the LTL
formula given below.
(
∧
i∈{1:5}
¬(©ARi ∧©Ri))
These results show that, as the probability that the robot correctly senses the location
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of the adversary increases, the robot will be more likely to avoid the unwanted contact
with the adversary. Because of the other error present in the model (the motion of the
robot), even when the sensor is perfect (i.e. it has a probability of 1.0 of correctly
detecting the location of the adversary) the robot has a less than perfect probability of
avoiding the adversary over the time bound (0.933).
When analyzed over a range of values for the probability that the robot correctly
moves when directed to do so by the automaton, the resulting probabilities show that
when the robot can never move correctly it will always avoid the adversary. This can be
attributed to the fact that the robot will be completely unable to move and will simply
remain in region G1 where it cannot encounter the adversary, but it will be unable to
satisfy its goals. As the likelihood that the robot moves correctly increases (until about
0.4), this probability decreases, before rising again to a value of 0.891 when the robot
moves without error. This behavior is due to the additional time required for the robot to
reach a dangerous region when the probability of correctly moving is low; if the robot
does not move into the central regions (where the adversary patrols), it will not violate
the analyzed formula.
By contrast, Figure 3.5 shows the probability that the robot satisfies all 3 of the goals
at least once, within the given time bound. In this case, the model was analyzed to find
the probability that the robot satisfied the following formula.
♦G1 ∧ ♦G2 ∧ ♦G3
This figure shows that, due to the likelihood that the robot remains stopped for long
portions of time, low probabilities on the motion of the robot result in low likelihoods of
satisfying all 3 goals. By contrast, errors in the sensing of the location of the adversary
have relatively little effect on the likelihood that the robot satisfies each of its goals at
least once; in this case, the sensor error prevents the robot from satisfying its goals only
when causing it to enter deadlock states, for which the synthesized controller has no
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Figure 3.5: Analysis results for the adversarial robot example: probability that the robot
satisfies all 3 goals within the time bound.
prescribed transition.
Revisions: In addition to the above analysis, Algorithms 8-11 were used to find
revisions to the task specification and lower-level components for this example. In each
case, the analysis focused on the safety specifications for the robot, requiring that it
avoid being in the same region as the adversary.
To find safety revisions for the controller specification, the specified undesirable
behavior was given by the formula φ =
∧
i∈{1:5}(ARi ∧ Ri), describing the situation
in which the robot enters the same region as the adversary. Algorithm 8 was then run
with a maximum step value of Nmax = 5, which was sufficient to find a safety revision
before terminating. The resulting safety revision found by the algorithm ((©¬AR1 ∧
©¬AR2 ∧ ©¬AR4) → ©¬R4), when included in the original specification, requires
that the robot avoid region R4 while the adversary is in R3 or R5. The new controller
results in an increase of 0.10 (at the nominal model probabilities) in the probability that
the robot always satisfies the formula φ within the time bound. Figure 3.6 shows the
probability that the robot satisfies (
∧
i∈{1:5} ¬(©ARi ∧ ©Ri)) for the original (solid
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Figure 3.6: Analysis results for the revised controller in the adversarial robot example:
probability that the robot avoids the adversary.
lines) and revised (dashed lines) controllers. The results shown in this figure show an
improvement in the behavior of the robot for all model probabilities close to the nominal
values.
An initial state revision was found (as in Algorithm 9) for the LTL formula φ =

∧
i∈{1:5} ¬(ARi ∧ Ri), requiring that the robot never end up in the same region as the
adversary. The resulting revision to the initial condition ψ = G3 specifies that the robot
is most likely to succeed over the analyzed time bound (25 discrete transitions) when
the robot starts in region G3. At the nominal model probabilities, Algorithm 9 found
that the likelihood of satisfying φ from an initial state in G3 was 0.8697, while the robot
had probabilities of 0.8225 and 0.8160 of satisfying φ when beginning in regions G2
and G1, respectively. This result is due to the process of traveling to region G3 being
more likely to cause a failure than the process of leaving G3; as such, by beginning in
G3, the robot is more likely to avoid that entry corridor within the analyzed time-bound.
Algorithm 10 was used to perform a sensitivity analysis on the low level compo-
nents for sensing the location of the adversary, and the motion of the robot. As before,
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the formula φ = 
∧
i∈{1:5} ¬(ARi ∧ Ri) was tested against, requiring that the robot
never end up in the same region as the adversary. The resulting analysis revealed that
improvements to the robot’s sensing would have a greater positive impact on the overall
performance of the robot than would improvements to the robot’s motion. This is un-
surprising, given the results shown in Figure 3.4, which show a greater upward slope (at
the nominal point) for the line representing changes in sensor accuracy.
Finally, Algorithm 11 was used to find the specified goal in pursuit of which the
robot was most likely to violate φ =
∧
i∈{1:5}(ARi ∧ Ri) by finding itself in the same
region as the adversary. The result of Algorithm 11 found that the robot was most
likely to violate φ while pursuing its third goal ♦G3 (with a probability of 0.4998),
than while pursuing either of it’s first two goals (probabilities of 0.2505 and 0.2164 for
♦G1 and ♦G2, respectively). Given the layout of the workspace (shown in Figure
3.3), this is unsurprising, as the robot must traverse through several dangerous regions
when attempting to move to region G3. Note that, because the analysis is performed
for a bounded time-frame, there is a positive probability that the robot will successfully
avoid the adversary for the entire time bound, and the sum of the probabilities of failure
for the goals is less than 1.
Each of the revision methods presented in Section 3.5 gives, for this example, a
revision suggestion that results in an improvement in the behavior of the robot. In fact,
multiple revisions could be included simultaneously to have a greater impact on the
behavior of the robot. In doing so, it is important to consider the effects of each revision.
For example, if one were to remove the third liveness condition they would likely not
want to restrict the initial condition of the robot to G3, as the removal of the liveness
condition removes the need to use that dangerous corridor at all, unless the robot were
to start in region G3.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a method for accounting for errors in the sensing and actuation of
mobile robots, when controlled by a correct-by-construction automaton that is synthe-
sized from a set of high-level task specifications. The paper discusses the composition
of a Discrete-Time Markov Chain model of the system, which includes the probabilistic
errors in sensing and actuation, and the analysis of that model with respect to a set of
LTL formulas.
Furthermore, four complementary methods are given for providing feedback to the
user in a semi-automated fashion. By adding safety specifications, restricting the initial
state of the robot, improving the performance of a particular low-level component, or
removing a particularly troublesome liveness condition, the user may be able to improve
the overall performance of the robot when operating with the modeled error.
The presented approach seeks to advance the field of synthesized robot controllers
by relaxing the standard assumption of perfect sensing and actuation. Future work by the
authors will focus on improving the revision process, and on incorporating the system
uncertainty in the synthesis process to yield a correct-by-construction controller that is
more robust to errors in sensing and actuation.
CHAPTER 4
AUTOMATIC SYNTHESIS OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTROLLERS FOR ROBOTS
WITH IMPERFECT SENSING AND ACTUATION
4.1 Introduction
Recent work in robotics has developed techniques that enable the automatic synthesis of
abstract robot controllers from high-level task specifications [4, 8, 17, 32, 34, 35, 56, 62].
Such techniques offer several advantages over more traditional programming, such as
more intuitive task description, a lower technical barrier to entry, and formal guarantees
on the behavior of the resulting controller. The approach presented in [37], for example,
synthesizes a controller in a manner which guarantees that the resulting controller will
satisfy all of its underlying specifications. This guarantee, however, is predicated on the
assumption that the robot operates with perfect sensing and actuation.
The work presented in this paper relaxes that assumption, and describes a method
for accounting for the probabilistic behavior of the robot (as caused by erroneous sen-
sors and actuators) when synthesizing the controller. The resulting controller not only
satisfies the specifications assuming perfect sensing and actuation, but minimizes the
probability that a robot operating with the modeled errors in its sensing and actuation
will violate a prescribed behavior. The approach allows the user to specify the robot’s
task at an abstract level, and is general enough to be applied to a wide array of robotics
problems. Additionally, by adjusting the formula that is used in the synthesis process
and describes the desired behavior, the resulting controller can be quickly and easily
modified to more likely avoid or exhibit a specified behavior. Coupled with the work
described in [28–30], the probabilistic behavior of the synthesized controller can be
quickly analyzed with respect to the modeled error probabilities to determine the prob-
abilistic behavior of the robot and provide feedback to the user in the form of possible
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revisions to the task specification.
4.1.1 Related Work
In [42] and [43], the authors present an approach for synthesizing complex motion plans
that maximize the probability that the robot satisfies a temporal logic specification when
the outcomes of the robot’s motion is uncertain (due to errors in localization and mo-
tion). In [20], the authors present an approach for synthesizing a control policy from
a temporal logic specification for use in an initially unknown, stochastic environment;
the policy is then iteratively updated to create an approximately optimal controller for a
learned model. The approach presented in this paper differs from these works in that it
is used to synthesize a controller which reacts to observed changes in the robot’s envi-
ronment; this enables the synthesis of controllers for a wider range of tasks in which the
robot changes its behavior based on observed changes in its environment.
In [46], the authors present a method for synthesizing a control strategy which maxi-
mizes the probability that a robot will satisfy a given set of temporal logic specifications
within a specific time-frame. They consider the case where the robot operates in a time-
varying environment, for which the environment changes can be modeled stochastically.
The approach presented in this paper differs from this work by the inclusion of abstract
actions for the robot, in addition to the motion problem. The inclusion of abstract, non-
motion actions allows for the specification of more complicated tasks, in which the robot
may manipulate or influence its environment.
In [10], the authors describe a method for synthesizing a controller which maximizes
the probability of satisfying a specification while reacting to time-varying observations
of the robot’s environment. These observations are formulated as propositions that may
be true or false (with some probability) at each vertex in the partitioned environment;
the truth value of each proposition can be determined by the robot only once it reaches
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the vertex in question. In [57], the authors present a method for synthesizing a con-
troller which maximizes the probability that a deterministic plant satisfies a temporal
logic specification, when interacting with other, probabilistic agents. Both of these ap-
proaches allow for the synthesis of controllers that react to changes in the robot’s en-
vironment, but use different formulations for the environment than the abstract event
formulation used in this work. The formulation used in this work is identical to that
used in [28–30], allowing those techniques (the analysis and revision of synthesized
controllers) to be directly applied, as well as providing a formulation that is general
enough to be applied to a wide range of applications.
Other related work includes approaches for synthesizing controllers which are op-
timal with respect to some other continuous metric. The authors in [54] describe a
method for automatically generating an optimal robot trajectory which satisfies robot
tasks specified in temporal logic formulas and minimizes the time between reaching
states satisfying a specified subformula. In [59], the authors present an approach for
synthesizing an optimal robot controller to minimize the weighted average transition
cost with respect to a given transition system, while satisfying a set of temporal logic
constraints. The authors of [60] present a method for generating an optimal controller
for discrete-time dynamical systems, from a robot task specification given as a set of
logical formulas. These formulas are converted into mixed-integer linear constraints to
reduce computation effort.
Of particular interest here is the work presented in [26], which presents an approach
for automatically synthesizing an optimal robot controller from temporal logic specifi-
cations in adversarial environment. The optimal controller minimizes a cost function
that accounts for the required robot’s action cost and the possible delay due to changes
in the environment. This approach allows for the synthesis of a controller that is reac-
tive; that is, the robot changes its behavior based on observed changes in the state of
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the environment. The work presented in this paper uses the method described in [26],
and presents a cost function to synthesize a controller that minimizes the probability
that the robot violates a set of specifications, while operating with sensing and actuation
uncertainty. Specifically, this work considers a different, but related, problem to that in
[26]: rather than creating a cost function to penalize time delays and travel distance for a
task, this paper presents a cost function that penalizes behaviors with high probabilities
of failure.
This work compliments the authors previous work in [28–30], which describe meth-
ods for modeling errors in the robots sensing and actuation, and including those errors
in a composed model of the system. This model can then be analyzed to determine the
probability that the robot, when operating with the synthesized controller, will satisfy a
particular temporal logic formula. This analysis can also be leveraged to automatically
provide the user with suggested revisions to the original controller specification, in or-
der to improve the probabilistic behavior of the robot. The probabilistic models used
for the environment behavior, and the sensor and actuator error, are used in this paper to
directly synthesize a controller which minimizes the probability of violating a particular
temporal logic formula.
4.1.2 Example 1
As an illustrating example, consider a robot that operates in the workspace shown in
Figure 4.1. The robot is tasked with exploring each of the four goal regions (G1 - G4,
shown in green), in search of a target. Once a target is found, the robot must mark it and
return to theBase region. During execution, the robot must avoid theDoor region when
it is closed, and must avoid getting stuck (which may occur, with varying likelihoods,
when moving through the non-goal regions).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes neces-
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Figure 4.1: Discretized workspace for Example 1.
sary background information. Section 4.3 defines the problem that is being addressed.
Section 4.4 then describes the cost function used to synthesize the controller that mini-
mizes the probability that the robot violates a given temporal logic formula. Section 4.5
presents and compares several controllers created using the described cost function and
minimizing different temporal logic formulas. Finally, some concluding remarks are
given in Section 4.6.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic
The work in this paper uses Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas to express temporal
properties of the system. The syntax for an LTL formula φ, over a set of Boolean
propositions Π, is defined recursively in (4.1).
φ ::= true | pi ∈ Π | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | © φ | φUφ (4.1)
The semantics of an LTL formula φ is defined over an infinite sequence σ = σ0, σ1, σ2, . . .,
where σi is the set of Boolean propositions pi ∈ Π that are true at position i in the se-
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quence. An infinite sequence σ is said to satisfy an LTL formula φ (denoted σ  φ) if
σ0 satisfies φ as described in (4.2).
σi  pi iff pi ∈ σi
σi  ¬φ iff σi 2 φ
σi  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff σi  φ1 and σi  φ2
σi ©φ iff σi+1  φ
σi  φ1 U φ2 iff ∃k | k ≥ i s.t. σk  φ2
and ∀j | i ≤ j < k : σj  φ1
(4.2)
Intuitively, σi satisfies the formula ©φ if σi+1 satisfies φ; σi satisfies the formula
φ1Uφ2 if φ2 becomes true at some future position σk, and φ1 is true until then. The
operators described in (4.1) and (4.2) can be used to define additional operators. Of note
for this work are the disjunction (∨), implication (→), and bi-conditional (↔) operators,
which can be derived from the negation (¬) and conjunction (∧) operators, as well as
the temporal operators for eventually (♦) and always (), which can be derived from
the until (U) operator. A more detailed description of the syntax and semantics of LTL
formulas can be found in [14].
4.2.2 Controller Synthesis
The work presented here uses a controller synthesis approach that is based on the ap-
proach described in [37]. In this approach, the robot’s task is defined as a set of LTL
formulas over the Boolean propositions Π = X ∪ Y , where X is a set of proposi-
tions that represent abstract, time-varying characteristics of the environment and Y
is a set of propositions describing the abstract state of the robot (including its loca-
tion in the discretized workspace). The set of environment propositions for Example
1 is defined as X = {Target, Closed} The set of robot propositions is defined as
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Y = R ∪ {Mark, Stuck}, where R represents the set of regions in the discretized
workspace of Figure 4.1.
The desired behavior of the robot is described by a formula φ (shown in (4.3)), which
is restricted to the General Reactivity (1) class of LTL formulas [51].
φ = (ϕei ∧ ϕet ∧ ϕeg)→ (ϕsi ∧ ϕst ∧ ϕsg) (4.3)
The formula given in (4.3) defines a desired robot behavior (described by ϕsi,t,g), in
response to the observed behavior of the environment (described by ϕei,t,g). The formulas
ϕei and ϕ
s
i are Boolean formulas Bi over X ∪ Y , which describe the initial states of the
environment and robot, respectively. The formulas ϕet and ϕ
s
t , referred to as safety
specifications, take the formBt, and represent restrictions on the allowable transitions
of the environment and robot, which must hold at all times. For ϕet , Bt is a Boolean
formula over X ∪ Y ∪ ©X ; for ϕst , Bt is a Boolean formula over X ∪ Y ∪ ©X ∪
©Y . Finally, the formulas ϕeg and ϕsg, referred to as fairness and liveness conditions,
respectively, take the form ♦Bg, where Bg is a Boolean formula over X ∪ Y , and
represent properties of the environment and system which must infinitely often hold
true (i.e., goals).
An abridged version of the task specification is shown in (4.4). The environment’s
initial condition ϕei requires that the robot is not sensing a Target, and that the door
region is not Closed. The robot’s initial condition ϕsi requires that it start in the Base
region, is not Stuck, and has notMarked a target. The environment safety specification
ϕet requires that the robot can only find a Target in one of the Gi regions. The envi-
ronment fairness condition ϕeg specifies that the door region cannot remain Closed in-
definitely. The robot safety specifications ϕst require that the robot avoid getting Stuck,
that it does not move through the Door region when it is Closed, and that the robot
Mark a Target (and that it remain Marked) after one has been found. Finally, the
robot liveness conditions specify that the robot should return to the Base after it has
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found and Marked a Target, and should otherwise continuously visit each of the four
Goal regions.
ϕei

¬Target∧¬Closed
ϕet
{

(
¬∨i∈{1,2,3,4}Gi)→ ¬© Target)
ϕeg
{
♦(¬Closed)
ϕsi

¬Mark∧¬Stuck∧
Base
ϕst

(¬© Stuck)∧
(©Closed→ ¬©Door)∧
((©Target ∨Mark)↔©Mark)
ϕsg

♦(Mark → Base)∧
i∈{1,2,3,4}
♦(¬Mark → Gi)
(4.4)
Note that the second of the robot liveness conditions (ϕgs) is replaced, during synthe-
sis, with a series of formulas (and corresponding propositions) such that the synthesis
process may re-order the goals to a more optimal order; details of this process can be
found in [26]. Additionally, the first robot safety condition ϕst requires that the robot al-
ways avoid being Stuck; as such, the proposition Stuck is never true in the synthesized
controller, and will only become true due to errors in the robot’s actuation.
The resulting controller that is synthesized (from the approach described in [51])
takes the form of a finite-state machine (FSM): A = {S, S0,Π, δ, L}. The set of states
is given by S, where S0 ⊆ S is the set of possible initial states, and Π = X ∪Y is the set
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of environment and robot propositions described above. The controller moves between
states according to the transition function δ : S × 2X → S, which maps a state and
the set of environment (input) propositions that are true, to a successor state. Finally,
L : S → 2Y is a labeling function which maps each state to the subset of the robot
propositions Y that are true in that state.
4.2.3 Optimal Controller Synthesis
This paper utilizes the optimal controller synthesis algorithm introduced in [26], which
solves the problem of synthesizing optimal robot controller from high-level task specifi-
cation for adversarial environment. The controller generated is in the form of finite state
machine defined in Section 4.2.2. Each transition in the FSM is assigned with a cost
function defined in a tuple (cd, ct), where cd and ct can be any value representing the
cost of the corresponding transition in the FSM; in [26], cd and ct are use to represent
the cost of environment-forced delays and the cost of moving between locations in the
workspace, respectively.
Given a user-defined cost preference relation, the optimal controller synthesis algo-
rithm can take any prioritization over the possible cost choices and generate the optimal
controller to minimize the total accumulated cost over a sequence of states to satisfy the
robot goals ϕsg. The synthesis algorithm uses multiple fixed-point computations to find
the set of states that satisfy the given robot tasks. The optimization is achieved in the
synthesis step by incorporating the cost metrics in the fixed-point computations. The
cost is accumulated for each state as the robot makes progress towards its goals. By
choosing the sequence of states with minimal accumulated cost, the synthesized con-
troller is guaranteed to be optimal with respect to the given cost metric.
In this paper, the cost tuple (cd, ct) is replaced by a cost cψ describing the proba-
bilistic behavior of the robot. The calculation of this cost is detailed in Section 4.4, and
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uses a probabilistic model of the system, included the errors in the robot’s sensing and
actuation.
4.2.4 Probabilistic Error Models
In order to model the effects of sensing and actuation errors on the behavior of the robot,
the work in this paper adopts the probabilistic models presented in [28], [29], and [30].
The true changes in the environment configuration are modeled by a set of probabilities
P (Xt+1|Xt, Yt), where Xt+1 ⊆ X is the set of environment propositions that are true
in the next step, Xt ⊆ X is the set of environment propositions that are true in the
current step, and Yt ⊆ Y is the set of robot propositions that are true in the current step.
Note that, for such a model, the new configuration of the environment is dependent only
on the previous configurations of the environment and robot. In the given example,
the probability that the robot encounters a target in each of the goal regions is 0.25:
p(Targett+1|Gi,t) = 0.25 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; the probability that the robot encounters
a target elsewhere is 0: p(Targett+1|Y ∈ 2Y\{G1,G2,G3,G4}) = 0. In any given discrete
time step, the probability that the Door closes is 0.5: p(Closedt+1) = 0.5.
In order to model the robot’s sensor error, an additional set of propositions X ::=
{x|x ∈ X} is used to represent the robot’s observations of the environment propo-
sitions, such that each environment proposition x ∈ X has a corresponding sensor
proposition x ∈ X which, when the sensor is correct, mimics the truth value of the
environment proposition. Changes in the sensor configuration, then, are modeled by
the set of probabilities P (X t+1|Xt+1, X t, Yt). Similarly to the environment model, the
new configuration of the sensor X t+1 ⊆ X is dependent only on the new environ-
ment configuration Xt+1 ⊆ X , and the previous configurations of the sensors X t ⊆ X
and robot Yt ⊆ Y . For the given example, the robot’s sensors are described by the
set of propositions X = {Target, Closed}. The probability that the robot correctly
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senses the presence of a Target is modeled to be 0.9: p(Targett+1|Targett+1) =
p(¬Targett+1|¬Targett+1) = 0.9. Similarly, the probability that the robot correctly
identifies when theDoor isClosed is 0.75: p(Closedt+1|Closedt+1) = p(¬Closedt+1|¬Closedt+1) =
0.75.
Finally, the changes in the state of the robot are modeled by the set of probabilities
P (Yt+1|Y t+1, Yt). This model uses a new set of propositions Y ::= {y|y ∈ Y} to repre-
sent the desired state of the robot. That is, the output of the FSM controller is a subset
of propositions Y t+1 ⊆ Y designating the set of robot propositions that should become
true in the next step. Due to error in the robot’s actuation, this set may not exactly match
the actual configuration of the robot in the next step (Yt+1 ⊆ Y). Modeled in this man-
ner, the actual new state of the robot Yt+1 ⊆ Y is dependent on the desired new state
of the robot Y t+1 ⊆ Y , and the current state of the robot Yt ⊆ Y . In this example, the
probability that the robot gets Stuck while moving through regions {R4, R6} (the yel-
low regions in Figure 4.1) is modeled to be 0.1: p(Stuckt+1|Ri,t) = 0.1 for i ∈ {4, 6}.
Similarly, the probability that the robot gets Stuck while moving through region R5
(the red region in Figure 4.1) is 0.35: p(Stuckt+1|R5,t) = 0.35. The probability that the
robot gets stuck when moving through any other region is modeled to be 0. Note that,
in this example, the error in actuation is only depended on the current state of the robot,
and is not affected by the desired new state.
It should be noted that this error model does not explicitly account for localization
error. Rather, it is assumed that the localization error is small enough that the robot can
correctly determine which region (in a discretized workspace) it is in. Any errors in
localization, along with errors in the movement of the robot, are captured by the set of
probabilities P (Yt+1|Y t+1, Yt) that model the changes in the state of the robot, which
includes the robot’s location in the discretized workspace.
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4.3 Problem Statement
The work presented in this paper describes an approach for synthesizing a robot con-
troller that minimizes the probability that a robot, which operates with errors in its sens-
ing and actuation, will violate a prescribed behavior. Such a process requires that the
minimized cost function account for the expected changes in the environment, as well
as the expected errors in sensing and actuation. To do this, the changes in the envi-
ronment, as well as the errors in sensing and actuation, are modeled, as described in
Section 4.2.4, with the sets of probabilities P (Xt+1|Xt, Yt), P (X t+1|Xt+1, X t, Yt), and
P (Yt+1|Y t+1, Yt), respectively.
Additionally, this process requires the specification of a formula which represents the
desired behavior of the robot in the probabilistic system. To that end, define the desired
behavior of the robot ψ as a Boolean formula over X ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ Y . This formula is
restricted to the form of a Boolean formula over the current and next state of the system
(environment, sensors, and robot); in this manner, the synthesis process generates the
FSM that minimizes the probability of ever violating the formula ψ, similar to including
a safety constraint of the form ψ.
The problem addressed in this paper is as follows.
Problem: Given an LTL task specification φ, a probabilistic model of the envi-
ronment P (Xt+1|Xt, Yt), and probabilistic models of the errors in the robot’s sensing
P (X t+1|Xt+1, X t, Yt) and actuation P (Yt+1|Y t+1, Yt), synthesize an FSM A that satis-
fies the task specification φ and minimizes the probability that a robot (which operates
with the modeled probability) will violate the desired behavior ψ. That is, find the FSM
A∗ such that A∗  φ and p(A∗‖P (·) 2 ψ) = minAφ p(A‖P (·) 2 ψ), where P (·) de-
notes the probabilistic models of the environment and sensor/actuator error, and A  φ
denotes that the FSM A satisfies the formula φ (σ  φ for all possible executions σ of
A).
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4.4 Cost Function
The work presented in this paper adopts the optimal synthesis approach presented in
[26], which is briefly described in Section 4.2.3. This approach synthesizes an FSM that
satisfies the robot’s task specification, while minimizing the cost c. For this paper, a
different cost function is defined to capture the probability that the robot completes its
task while satisfying a given LTL formula. This is represented by the continuous cost cψ
which captures the probability that the robot violates a given formula ψ when making a
particular transition (as prescribed by the controller). Minimization of this cost during
the controller synthesis results in a controller that maximizes the probability that the
robot satisfies the formula ψ.
For the following, let the current state of the system be represented by 〈Xt, X t, Yt〉,
which specifies the configuration of the environment Xt ∈ X , sensors X t ∈ X , and
robot Yt ∈ Y . The next state of the system, then, is represented by 〈Xt+1, X t+1, Yt+1〉,
where the actual configuration of the robot is a probabilistic result of the robot attempt-
ing to transition to a desired new state Y t+1 ∈ Y . Following this notation, the cost
function evaluates the cost of transitioning from the current sensor and robot configu-
rations 〈X t, Yt〉 to a desired robot configuration (as chosen by the controller) for a new
sensor configuration 〈X t+1, Y t+1〉.
The cost function cψ represents the probability that each allowable (with respect to
the original specification) transition by the robot results in a new state which violates the
formula ψ. A smaller (more negative) value of cψ indicates that the chosen transition is
less likely to violate the desired behavior ψ, and is therefore a more desirable transition
than one with a larger value of cψ. Each transition in the controller may result in multi-
ple, different, true states of the system 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉; it is these true states that determine
if the robot’s behavior violates the formula ψ. The transition between two states in the
controller is denoted as ∆(〈·〉, 〈·〉), and the cost of that transition is calculated as shown
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in (4.5).
cψ(∆(〈X t, Yt〉, 〈X t+1, Y t+1〉)) =
log
 ∑
〈Xt+1,Yt+1〉
bel(〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉) · (1− 1ψ)
 (4.5)
The function 1ψ is an indicator function, which takes the value 1 when the state-pair
(〈Xt, Yt〉, 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉) satisfies the formula ψ, and 0 when the state-pair violates the
formula ψ. The summation in (4.5), then, calculates the belief that the specified tran-
sition results in a state 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉 that violates the formula ψ. The synthesis process
minimizes the sum of the cost over a sequence of states; by using the log of this belief,
this minimization is equivalent to minimizing the product, over the sequence of states,
of the belief that the transitions violate ψ.
The component bel(〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉), in (4.5), represents the belief that, from a given
initial state 〈Xt, X t, Yt〉, new sensor configurationX t+1, and desired new robot configu-
ration Y t+1, the new state of the environment and robot will be 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉. This belief
is found from the model probabilities described in Section 4.3, and given by:
bel(〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉) = bel(Xt+1) · bel(Yt+1) (4.6)
where bel(Xt+1) and bel(Yt+1) are given in (4.7) and (4.8), respectively.
bel(Xt+1) = η · p(X t+1|Xt+1, X t, Yt)
· p(Xt+1|Xt, Yt) (4.7)
bel(Yt+1) = p(Yt+1|Y t+1, Yt) (4.8)
As shown in (4.6), the belief that the new state is 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉 is broken into the
belief that the new environment configuration isXt+1 and the new robot configuration is
Yt+1; note that the cost function in (4.5) calculates the summation over the set of possible
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states 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉 ∈ 2X × 2Y . The belief that the new environment configuration is
Xt+1, shown in (4.7), is calculated from the probabilistic models for the environment
and sensor configurations, and is normalized with the normalization constant η. The
belief that the new robot configuration is Yt+1, shown in (4.8), is found directly from the
probabilistic model for the changes in the configuration of the robot.
If a particular transition ∆(〈X t, Yt〉, 〈X t+1, Y t+1〉) results only in states that satisfy
the formula ψ, then the indicator function will be 1 for all of the possible new states, and
the cost function (4.5) for that transition will evaluate to log(0) = −∞. Conversely, if
the transition may only result in states that violate ψ, then the indicator function will be
0 for each state and the cost function (4.5) will sum to log(1) = 0. Finally, if a transition
results in some states that violate ψ, and some states that satisfy ψ, then the cost function
(4.5) will sum to log(β) where β is the total belief that the transition in question results
in one of the violating states.
Consider Example 1, where the environment configuration is Xt = {} (no Target
and the door is not Closed), and the robot configuration is Yt = {R7} (the robot is in
region R7, has not Marked a target, and is not Stuck). Let the new sensor configu-
ration be X t+1 = {}, and let the new desired robot configuration be Y t+1 = {Door}.
Figure 4.2(a) shows a graphical depiction of this transition.
For this configuration, there are two possible new states of the environment Xt+1 ∈
{{}, {Closed}} (the door may be either open or Closed, and Target must be false),
and one possible resulting state for the robot Yt+1 = {Door} (since the robot will not
get stuck moving through region R7). As a result of the possible errors in the sensing
and actuation of the robot, the desired transition may result in two possible states of
the system: the robot may move into the Door region when it correctly senses that it is
open, or it may do so when it fails to detect that the door is actually Closed. A graphical
depiction of the possible transitions is shown in Figure 4.2(b).
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(a) Possible desired transition for Example 1, to
be evaluated during the controller synthesis.
(b) The possible outcomes of the desired tran-
sition.
Figure 4.2: A graphical representation of a single desired transition and the possible
outcomes (due to sensing and actuation error) for Example 1.
84
To find the cost of the intended transition, the belief in each possible outcome is
found as described in (4.6)-(4.8). The belief that the transition will result in each of
the possible configurations is shown in (4.9). In this equation, η, which normalizes
bel(Xt+1) over the set of possible new environment configurations Xt+1, takes a value
of 2, such that (η · 0.75 · 0.5) + (η · 0.25 · 0.5) = 1.
bel(Xt+1 = {}) =η · p(¬Closedt+1|¬Closedt+1)
· p(¬Closedt+1)
= η · 0.75 · 0.5
= 0.75
bel(Xt+1 = {Closed}) = η · p(¬Closedt+1|Closedt+1)
· p(Closedt+1)
= η · 0.25 · 0.5
= 0.25
bel(Yt+1 = {Door}) = p(Doort+1|Doort+1)
= 1
(4.9)
Given a formula ψ = ©Closed → ¬©Door (which requires that the robot avoid
entering the Door region when it is Closed), the indicator function 1ψ takes a value of 1
when the new state is 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉 = 〈{}, {Door}〉. Conversely, when the new state is
〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉 = 〈{Closed}, {Door}〉, the indicator function 1ψ takes a value of 0 (since
the state violates the formula ψ). Accordingly, the evaluation of the cost function for
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this possible transition of the FSM is given in (4.10).
cψ(∆(〈X t, Yt〉, 〈X t+1, Y t+1〉)) =
log
 ∑
〈Xt+1,Yt+1〉
bel(〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉) · (1− 1ψ)

= log [(0.75 · 1 · (1− 1)) + (0.25 · 1 · (1− 0))]
= log(0.25)
(4.10)
Formulated in this manner, the cost function described in Eqs. 4.5-4.8 is remi-
niscent of Bayesian estimation and filtering techniques. The likelihood of each new
true state 〈Xt+1, Yt+1〉 is determined from the previous state 〈Xt, Yt〉, the control in-
puts Y t+1, and the new sensor information X t+1. The new state is determined using
the prior probabilities that model the changes in the environment p(Xt+1|Xt, Yt) and
robot p(Yt+1|Y t+1, Yt) configurations, as well as the posterior probability that models
the changes in the robot’s sensors p(X t+1|Xt+1, X t, Yt). Note that the proposed cost
function also assumes the Markov property: the probability distribution of the new state
is independent of the state history, given the current state.
It is important to note that the current environment configuration Xt in this cost
function is assumed to be equivalent to the current sensor configuration X t. That is,
the cost function assumes that the current state is a “correct” one: the state does not
violate any specifications, and the sensor configuration is an accurate representation
of the environment. As a whole, this means that synthesis algorithm optimizes the
probability that a robot following the prescribed behavior will satisfy the formula ψ. In
other words, this method does not optimize the controller’s chance of recovering from
an incorrect (but safe) transition while satisfying ψ.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Changing ψ
Several controllers were synthesized, using the approach discussed in Section 4.2.3 and
minimizing the cost cψ, for Example 1. The behavior of the synthesized controller can
be changed by choosing a different formula ψ to use for the cost function cψ. The re-
sult is a controller which minimizes the probability that the robot violates the prescribed
behavior; this allows one to easily change the emphasized probabilistic behavior of the
robot to match a desired task. Figure 4.3 shows the resulting paths, which are truncated,
for the sake of clarity, to the portion of the behavior from the robot’s initial location
(shown with a solid black circle) to the robot’s position after visiting each of the four
goal regions once (hollow circle), for three different controllers, synthesized with dif-
ferent desired behavior formulas ψ.
Additionally, the probabilistic behavior of each of the controllers was analyzed to
find the probability that the robot, when operating with the model probabilities de-
scribed in Section 4.2.4, will find the target and return to the Base without getting
stuck or entering a closed Door region. These probabilities are found using the ap-
proach presented in [29] and [30] to compose a discrete, probabilistic model of the
system that includes sensor and actuation error. The PRISM probabilistic model check-
ing software [38] is then used to find the probability that the composed system satis-
fies the following LTL formula, which requires that the system maintains the property
(¬Stuck ∧ (Closed→ ¬Door)).
Figure 4.3(a) shows the truncated path of a robot operating with a controller found
by minimizing the formula ψ = ©Closed → ¬© Door. In this case, the controller
is synthesized to minimize only the probability that the robot erroneously enters the
Door region when it is Closed, and is not required to avoid the regions where it may
87
(a) Path of the synthesized
controller, found by minimiz-
ing the probability of violat-
ing:
ψ = ©Closed → ¬ ©
Door.
(b) Path of the synthesized
controller, found by minimiz-
ing the probability of violat-
ing:
ψ = ¬© Stuck.
(c) Path of the synthesized
controller, found by minimiz-
ing the cost cψ , where ψ =
¬ © Stuck ∧ (©Closed →
¬©Door).
Figure 4.3: Resulting paths for three controllers that were synthesized with different
ψ formulas. While the synthesized controllers exhibit infinite behaviors, the depicted
paths are truncated to the initial visit to each goal region G1 −G4.
get Stuck. The resulting controller avoids the Door region, and takes the shortest path
to exploring each of the four goal regions. This controller results in a probability of
0.4558 that the robot satisfies (¬Stuck ∧ (Closed → ¬Door)). In contrast, because
this controller completely avoids the Door region, the robot has a probability of 1.0 that
it will maintain the behavior described by ψ and satisfy (Closed→ ¬Door).
Figure 4.3(b) shows the truncated path of a robot operating with a controller found
by minimizing the formula ψ = ¬ © Stuck. This controller proceeds through the
Door region, in order to avoid the regions R5 and R6 where it may get Stuck. It does so
because the new formula ψ only penalizes the controller for getting Stuck, but no longer
does so for the robot entering theDoor region when it is Closed. Furthermore, note that
the synthesized controller approaches G2 by traversing through R4, which has a lower
probability of resulting in the robot getting stuck than traversing through region R5.
The controller synthesized for this desired behavior ψ improves upon the probabilistic
behavior of the first controller, and has a probability of 0.5298 of completing its task
without getting Stuck or entering the Door region when it is closed. In contrast, the
robot has a probability of 0.9325 that it will maintain the behavior described by ψ and
satisfy (¬Stuck).
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Finally, a third controller was synthesized for a formula ψ that requires the robot to
avoid getting stuck and to only proceed through the Door region when it is not closed:
ψ = ¬© Stuck ∧ (©Closed → ¬© Door). Figure 4.3(c) shows the truncated path
for the robot. The behavior exhibited by this controller takes a more complicated path,
in order to avoid the region R5, as well as the Door region. This is due to the high
probability of violating ψ that is introduced when traversing each region. Region R5
exhibits a relatively high probability (0.35) that the robot gets stuck, while there is a
reasonably large probability (0.25) that the robot fails to correctly sense that the Door
is Closed and enters the region; in either case, the robot violates the prescribed formula
ψ. In contrast, the regions R4 and R6, which must be traversed in order to reach regions
G2 and G4 (if the robot is avoiding Door and R5) have a considerably lower probability
(0.1) of causing the robot to violate ψ. This controller improves upon the probabilistic
behavior of both of the prior controllers (with respect to the analyzed property), and has
a probability of 0.7125 that it satisfies the property (¬Stuck ∧ (Closed→ ¬Door)).
4.5.2 Changing the Model Probabilities
In addition to modifying the desired behavior ψ, new behaviors can be found when con-
trollers are synthesized for systems with different model probabilities P (Xt+1|Xt, Yt),
P (X t+1|Xt+1, X t, Yt), and P (Yt+1|Y t+1, Yt). Consider the controller that was synthe-
sized for ψ = ¬© Stuck ∧ (©Closed→ ¬©Door), that resulted in the path shown
in Figure 4.3(c). If a different set of model probabilities are used for the controller syn-
thesis, the resulting controller will minimize the probability of violating ψ for the new
probabilities.
If the probabilistic model of the system is adjusted such that the Door is unlikely to
become Closed by adjusting the probability p(Closedt+1) = 0.1, then the synthesized
controller yields a different behavior (despite being synthesized for the same ψ). Fig-
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ure 4.4(a) shows the resulting (truncated) path for a controller synthesized with this new
probabilistic model and a desired behavior ψ = ¬©Stuck∧(©Closed→ ¬©Door).
Because the Door is now unlikely to actually Close, the robot can more safely move
through that region; as such, this controller exhibits the same behavior as the controller
shown in Figure 4.3(b), where the desired behavior ψ did not account for a Closed
Door. For a system exhibiting the modified probabilistic behavior, the new controller
has a probability of 0.8595 of satisfying(¬Stuck∧ (Closed→ ¬Door)); in contrast,
the original controller is less likely to satisfy this property (probability of 0.7125) in the
modified system.
Similarly, if the probabilistic model is instead adjusted such that the robot is highly
likely to get Stuck when moving through region R1 (let p(Stuckt+1|R1,t) = 0.35
and p(Closedt+1) = 0.5), a different behavior is exhibited for ψ = ¬ © Stuck ∧
(©Closed → ¬© Door). Figure 4.4(b) shows the resulting (truncated) path for this
controller. Note that the controller now avoids region R1, even at the expense of mov-
ing through the Door region and region R6. The new controller has a probability of
0.5855 that it satisfies(¬Stuck∧ (Closed→ ¬Door)) for the modified model proba-
bilities, while the original controller, which was synthesized without accounting for the
increased probability of getting Stuck while moving through R1, performs worse, with
a probability of 0.5668.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a method for automatically synthesizing a robot controller from
a set of high-level task specifications, which maximizes the probability that a robot,
operating under the modeled conditions, will satisfy a given temporal logic formula. The
presented work uses the synthesis approach described in [26], and gives a cost function
that captures the probability that a robot will violate a formula ψ. By minimizing this
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(a) Path of the synthesized controller, when
the probabilistic model is adjusted such
that p(Closedt+1) = 0.1.
(b) Path of the synthesized controller, when
the probabilistic model is adjusted such
that p(Stuckt+1|R1,t) = 0.35.
Figure 4.4: Resulting paths for two controllers that were synthesized for different proba-
bilistic models, with ψ = ¬©Stuck∧(©Closed→ ¬©Door). While the synthesized
controllers exhibit infinite behaviors, the depicted paths are truncated to the initial visit
to each goal region G1 −G4.
cost during the controller synthesis, the resulting controller maximizes the probability
that the robot satisfies the formula throughout execution.
This work complements the authors’ previous work [28–30], and relaxes the as-
sumption that a robot’s sensors and actuators operate without error. By relaxing this
assumption and probabilistically modeling the behavior of the environment and errors
in the sensors and actuators, the proposed method can be used to automatically create
the deterministic controller that is most likely to behave in the desired manner. This al-
lows the user to quickly and easily create robot controllers for complex tasks, which are
guaranteed to behave in a manner that minimizes the probability that the robot will vi-
olate a prescribed behavior, under the modeled probabilities. Coupled with the authors’
previous work, this provides a method for synthesizing, analyzing, and revising correct-
by-construction robot controllers in situations where the robot operates with errors in its
sensing and actuation.
Future extensions of this work may investigate extending the cost-function to allow
for the placement of constraints on the total cost, allowing for the synthesis of a con-
troller which minimizes a given cost function (such as the distance traveled) while con-
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strained by another cost function (such as the probability that the robot satisfies a given
formula). Another area for future investigation is a modification to the cost function
or synthesis procedure that explicitly plans for the robot to take unintended transitions;
such a modification would allow the controller to robustly recover from errors during
execution.
CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND FORMAL ANALYSIS OF
HIGH-LEVEL TASKS WITH DYNAMIC OBSTACLE ANTICIPATION ON A
FULL-SIZED AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
5.1 Introduction
Complex robotic tasks require solutions that integrate a large number of different com-
ponents to perceive and interpret the robot’s environment, and to decide and act intel-
ligently based on those perceptions. An autonomous vehicle, for example, must not
only localize itself within its environment, but must also locate other vehicles and ob-
stacles, and act to avoid them. In most cases, a robot’s perception of its environment
is represented probabilistically, while the robot’s decision making must necessarily be
deterministic.
Autonomous vehicles typically use planners that rely on rapid re-planning to re-
act to dynamic objects in the environment [3, 47, 58]. In order to drive safely around
other vehicles, these planners use ad-hoc rules to decide whether or not an action is
safe [5]. The brittleness of this approach was exemplified by the collision between the
Cornell and MIT 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge entries [19]. A natural, formal way
to improve autonomous vehicle safety when operating in dynamic environments is to
include ‘anticipation’, or explicitly reasoning about the future behavior of dynamic ob-
jects, in planning algorithms. Anticipation of dynamic objects has received interest in
the field in recent years, and fully probabilistic, fast, and accurate algorithms are avail-
able [6, 13, 21, 23, 25, 48, 63]. Integration of anticipation and planning can be done
at a low-level, by including anticipation as a term in a cost-function while computing
vehicle actuation commands, as in [23], or at a high-level, using anticipation to make
route and behavior decisions, as in previous work by the authors [27].
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One method for creating controllers for complex tasks is to formally synthesize a
discrete controller from a set of high-level task specifications [4, 8, 17, 32, 34, 36, 44,
56, 61]. Such methods typically use temporal logic formulas to specify the desired
behavior of the robot, and allow for the creation of controllers that are provably correct;
that is, the synthesized controllers are guaranteed to satisfy the task specifications from
which they were synthesized.
The work presented in this paper adopts the approach described in [37], in which a
temporal logic task specification is used to describe the desired behavior of a robot, in
reaction to perceived changes in the environment. This approach can then be used to au-
tomatically generate a correct-by-construction controller that is guaranteed to satisfy the
underlying task specification. This guarantee, however, is predicated on the assumption
that the robot operates with perfect sensing and actuation.
This paper continues previous work [27], and investigates the fusion of probabilistic
perception (through the anticipation of dynamic obstacles) with deterministic decision
making (by a correct-by-construction hybrid controller). The anticipation algorithms
provide a probabilistic belief about the future state of the environment, allowing the
robot to plan ahead rather than relying entirely on reactionary planning. The formal
controller synthesis allows for the creation of controllers that behave in a verifiable
manner; furthermore, given a probabilistic model of the environment and the system,
the probabilistic behavior of the robot can also be formally verified [28].
The work discussed in this paper applies this approach to the problem of an au-
tonomous vehicle operating in environment with multiple intersections and other mov-
ing vehicles. Unlike the authors’ previous work [27], in this paper the anticipation
algorithm and synthesized controller are implemented on a full-scale autonomous car,
pictured in Figure 5.1, which operated in a controlled environment with multiple sim-
ulated vehicles, which were controlled by human operators (also shown in Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: The autonomous vehicle, operating with a high-level, synthesized controller,
and anticipating the behavior of multiple, simulated obstacle-vehicles, which were con-
trolled by human drivers (also pictured).
Furthermore, experimental data was collected using the autonomous vehicle and human-
controlled obstacles (rather than via simulation), and the results are compared to a for-
mal analysis of the synthesized controller. The portions of this chapter that are original
work by the author are the
It should be noted that this chapter presents work that was conducted in collabora-
tion with Frank Havlak, another Ph.D. Candidate in Mechanical Engineering at Cornell
University. The controller synthesis, the formal model of the system, and the formal
analysis and comparison with the experimental data were all completed by the author
of this thesis; the obstacle anticipation, the abstraction of that anticipation to a Boolean
sensor value, and much of the implementation to run the code on the vehicle itself was
completed by Frank Havlak. Both authors collaborated to conduct the experiment, with
the assistance of several colleagues who helped to operate the obstacle vehicles.
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5.1.1 Related Work
Some recent research has investigated the use of synthesized controllers under condi-
tions where the sensors or actuators cannot be assumed to be perfect. In [42] and [43],
the authors present a method for incorporating a stochastic measure of the error in the
robot’s motion into the synthesis process, in order to generate the motion plan that is
most likely to satisfy a temporal logic specification. In [45], the authors use random
variables to represent uncertainty in the characterization of a robot’s environment, and
use Process Algebra to probabilistically validate behavior-based controllers and provide
guarantees on the performance of the robot. In [57], the authors present an approach
for synthesizing a controller for a robot which operates in the presence of other, proba-
bilistic agents; the synthesized controller maximizes the probability that the robot will
satisfy a given temporal logic specification.
In [61] the authors apply a receding-horizon approach to the problem of controller
synthesis, and present the approach in the context of an autonomous vehicle. The re-
sulting method allows the vehicle to quickly re-plan to account for unexpected obstacles
and events during operation; by applying a receding-horizon approach, the scope of the
synthesis is restricted enough to allow for online re-planning. In [2], the authors present
an approach for the online verification of trajectories for autonomous vehicles, using
reachability analysis to guarantee the safety of the maneuvers, in the presence of other,
moving vehicles.
Incorporating anticipation of dynamic objects in robot planning has seen increased
interest in recent years. The problem is complex; it is inherently probabilistic because
perfect knowledge of the future is impossible, and it requires not only a model of the
dynamics of the object being anticipated, but also of the controller of that object. Some
works simplify the problem by making deterministic predictions of object behavior [6,
48, 50], and these approaches work well when the behavior of the dynamics objects is
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known or communicated to the robot, as in a cooperative scenario.
Anticipation approaches that account for uncertainty in the future actions of dynamic
objects tend to resemble recursive estimation filters (like the Kalman filter and its vari-
ants), as in [12, 21]. These approaches can be extended by using Gaussian Mixture
Models (GMMs) to relax Gaussian assumptions and reduce linearization errors, and to
include discrete states to capture high-level decisions of dynamic objects, as in [25]. The
assumed controller models can be improved using data-driven machine learning tools,
as in [24].
The work presented in this paper directly addresses the problem of the incorpora-
tion of probabilistic environmental data into a deterministic, synthesized controller, and
provides probabilistic guarantees on the performance of the system. Furthermore, these
guarantees are compared to experimental data obtained from the operation of a full-scale
autonomous vehicle, operating in the presence of human-controlled obstacle vehicles.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents several background def-
initions. Section 5.3 describes the technical approach and the problem formulation.
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 describe the methodology used for the formal analysis and ex-
perimental platform, respectively. Section 5.6 presents and compares the results of the
analysis and experiment. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.7.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a logical formalism that allows for the expression of
temporal properties, over a set of Boolean propositions Π. The syntax for an LTL for-
mula φ is given in Equation 5.1. Such a formula consists of propositions (pi ∈ Π),
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logical operators (¬, ∧), and temporal operators (©, U).
φ ::= true | pi ∈ Π | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | © φ | φUφ (5.1)
The semantics of an LTL formula are defined over an infinite sequence σ = σ0, σ1, σ2 . . .,
where σi consists of a set of truth assignments to the Boolean propositions pi ∈ Π. The
semantics of an LTL formula are defined in Equation 5.2, where σi  φ denotes that σi
satisfies the formula φ (conversely, σi 2 φ denotes that σi does not satisfy the formula
φ). A sequence σ, then, satisfies a formula φ if and only if σ0  φ.
σi  pi iff pi ∈ σi
σi  ¬φ iff σi 2 φ
σi  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff σi  φ1 and σi  φ2
σi ©φ iff σi+1  φ
σi  φ1 U φ2 iff ∃k | k ≥ i s.t. σk  φ2
and ∀j | i ≤ j < k : σj  φ1
(5.2)
For the sake of brevity, only the portions of the LTL semantics relevant to the topic
of this paper are described here; for a more complete definition of the syntax and seman-
tics of LTL, the reader is referred to [14]. Intuitively, the operator ¬ indicates negation,
and the operator ∧ indicates a conjunction. The additional operators ∨ (disjunction),
→ (implication), and↔ (bi-conditional) can be defined from these two operators, and
are used to allow for formulas to be written in a more concise manner. The temporal
operator © denotes that a formula must be true in the next position in the sequence,
while the operator U indicates that some formula φ1 must be true for all positions in a
sequence up until a position where another formula φ2 is true. These temporal operators
can similarly be used to define additional operators; of note for this paper are the opera-
tors (which requires that a formula is true at all positions in a sequence) and ♦ (which
denotes that a formula must be true for some future position in the sequence).
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5.2.2 Controller Synthesis
The work presented in this paper adopts the approach described in [37] for automatically
synthesizing a correct-by-construction, discrete controller from a set of temporal logic
specifications. This approach uses a discrete abstraction of the system, where the state of
the environment is represented by a set of Boolean propositions X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
that model abstract events, which the robot observes. In the context of the autonomous
vehicle problem used in this paper, the environment propositions are used to represent
whether or not each of the vehicles route choices (at an intersection) are safe; this is done
with a set of Boolean propositions Unsafei, which are true when a particular route is
unsafe and false when that route is safe.
Similarly, the state of the robot is represented by the set of abstract propositions Y =
{a1, . . . , al, r1, . . . , rm}, which models the abstract actions that the robot can perform
(ai propositions) as well as the location of the robot within a discretized workspace
(ri propositions). For the autonomous vehicle example problem, the set of location
propositions ri represent which road segment the vehicle is on, in a discretized map.
The ai action propositions are used to track the decisions that the vehicle makes at
intersections: this includes a proposition that is true when the vehicle Stops, as well as
a set of propositions Drivei that indicate which route the vehicle takes when traversing
the intersection, where those routes correspond to the set of environment propositions
Unsafei.
From these abstractions and a task specification, a discrete controller (in the form
of a finite state automaton) can be synthesized, which is guaranteed to satisfy the given
task specification. The task specification is given in a fragment of LTL known as General
Reactivity (1), which is described, in detail, in [51]. LTL formulas in this fragment take
the form given in Equation 5.3.
φ = (ϕei ∧ ϕet ∧ ϕeg)→ (ϕsi ∧ ϕst ∧ ϕsg) (5.3)
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The above formula specifies a desired behavior for the robot ϕs = ϕsi ∧ ϕst ∧ ϕsg, in
response to changes in the state of the environment ϕe = ϕei ∧ ϕet ∧ ϕeg. In each case
(environment and robot) the behavior is broken down further, into three parts: an ini-
tial condition ϕe,si , safety specifications ϕ
e,s
t , and fairness/liveness conditions ϕe,sg . The
initial condition is given as a set of Boolean formulas Bi over the propositions X ∪ Y ,
and restricts the set of allowed initial configurations for the environment and the robot.
The safety specifications are given in the formBt, whereBt is a Boolean formula over
X ∪Y ∪©X ∪©Y; these formulas restrict the allowable transitions of the environment
and the robot. The fairness conditions ϕeg represent conditions that the environment
must satisfy infinitely often (e.g., specifying that a door in the environment must be-
come open at some point in the future), while the liveness conditions ϕsg represent goals
that the robot is required to satisfy; both conditions take the form ♦Bg, where Bg is a
Boolean formula over X ∪ Y .
From this specification, and the abstractions of the environment and robot, a con-
troller is synthesized using the approach described in [51]. The synthesized controller
takes the form of an finite state automaton A = {S, S0,X ,Y , δ, L}, with a set of states
S and a set of initial states S0 ⊆ S. The sets of propositions X and Y represent the
abstracted state of the environment and robot, as described previously. The transition
function δ : S× 2X → S maps each state and set of environment (input) propositions to
a successor state. Finally, the labeling function L : S → 2Y maps each state to the set
of robot propositions that are true at that state.
5.2.3 Gaussian Mixture Models
The anticipation algorithm used in this work represents the probability density func-
tion (pdf) over the state of a tracked dynamic object using Gaussian Mixture Models
(GMMs) [1]. GMMs are frequently used to represent non-Gaussian pdfs because they
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retain the convenient computational properties of Gaussian distributions, but can be used
to represent arbitrarily shaped pdfs. The pdf over a tracked dynamic object’s state at time
k (xk) is given by:
p (xk) =
Nk∑
i=1
wik · N
(
xk|µik,Σik
)
(5.4)
where wik, µ
i
k, and Σ
i
k are the weight, mean, and covariance of the i
th mixand in the
GMM, and Nk is the number of mixands in the GMM at time k. When propagating the
pdf forward in time through a dynamics model, each mixand can be treated indepen-
dently, so any of the many tools for propagating Gaussian uncertainties (e.g., Extended
Kalman transform, Sigma Point transform, etc.) can be used.
5.3 Technical Approach and Problem Formulation
In this work, the goal is to examine the fusion of probabilistic perception with determin-
istic decision making. The behavior of a synthesized controller is formally verified with
respect to the probabilistic anticipation of dynamic obstacles in the robot’s environment.
This verification is used to examine the tradeoffs of the abstraction of the probabilistic
information, and the results are compared to experimental data.
An overview of the approach presented in this paper is shown in Figure 5.2. First,
a high-level controller is synthesized from a set of task specifications. This controller
is then used to control the robot during execution, by making decisions based on the
anticipated behavior of dynamic obstacles in the robot’s environment. Before the results
of the anticipation are passed to the high-level controller, they are first abstracted from
a set of probability distributions to a set of Boolean values characterizing the robot’s
environment. In addition to the execution of the controller on the robot, a formal analysis
is performed on a composed model of the controller and the system probabilities, to
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Figure 5.2: Overview of the approach presented in this paper.
provide probabilistic guarantees on how the robot will behave during execution. The
approach is applied, in this paper, to the problem of an autonomous vehicle navigating
a road system while avoiding other vehicles.
5.3.1 Scenario
For the scenario used as an example in this paper, an autonomous vehicle is tasked with
navigating through the environment shown in Figure 5.3. The vehicle must repeatedly
visit each of the four corners on the map (marked in blue), in numerical order, and it
must avoid colliding with three dynamic obstacles (other vehicles), which are traveling
around the same workspace. When the vehicle arrives at an intersection (marked in
red), it determines which of the available choices are safe and which are unsafe. The
map used for the scenario examined in this paper is shown in Figure 5.3, though the
approach can be more generally applied to a wide variety of robotics scenarios. The
approach presented here could also be directly applied to a different road system, where
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Figure 5.3: Map of the workspace, divided into road segments. Intersections are indi-
cated by circles, with the possible vehicle choices shown as dashed lines. The vehicle is
required to repeatedly visit the four corners of the map, which are numbered and marked
with the blue circles.
the roads can be discretized into separate segments with known interconnections.
To accomplish this, the environment is abstracted to a set of Boolean propositions
X = {Unsafe1, Unsafe2, Unsafe3}. Each proposition is used to indicate that a par-
ticular choice at the vehicle’s current intersection is likely to result in a collision with
one of the dynamic obstacles (and is therefore unsafe). This allows the vehicle to use
the probabilistic anticipation of the dynamic obstacles to determine which roads it may
safely traverse (this process is discussed in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4).
Furthermore, these propositions are restricted by layout of the workspace, such that
an unavailable choice at an intersection is automatically deemed unsafe. That is, if the
vehicle arrives at an intersection where there are only two outgoing roads, Unsafe3 is
automatically set to true; likewise, if there is only one outgoing road at an intersection,
103
both Unsafe2 and Unsafe3 are automatically set to true.
5.3.2 Synthesized Controller
To synthesize a controller for this scenario (using the approach described in Section
5.2.2), a set of propositions Y = {Stop,Drive1, Drive2, Drive3, r1, . . . , rm} is de-
fined to model the abstract state of the vehicle. The set of propositions {r1, . . . , rm}
are mutually exclusive propositions which represent the location of the vehicle in the
discretized workspace (i.e., which road segment the vehicle is on). The propositions
{Stop,Drive1, Drive2, Drive3}, while not necessary for the synthesis and operation
of the controller, are used to indicate which decision is made by the controller at an
intersection; the inclusion of these propositions allows the human operator to more eas-
ily observe the robot’s decisions, and simplifies the specification of the robot’s task.
The proposition Drive1 indicates that the vehicle chooses to drive on the road segment
corresponding to the Unsafe1 environment proposition; likewise, Drive2 and Drive3
correspond to Unsafe2 and Unsafe3 respectively. The proposition Stop indicates,
when true, that the vehicle chooses to stop at the intersection and wait for it’s desired
path to become safe.
The vehicle’s controller is synthesized from an LTL task specification (as described
in Section 5.2.2) over the sets of propositions representing the abstracted state of the
environment and the robot (X and Y , respectively). An abridged specification is shown
below, where out(rj) is used to represent the set of outgoing roads from road segment
rj .
1. ¬Unsafe1 ∧ ¬Unsafe2 ∧ ¬Unsafe3
2. ¬Stop ∧ ¬Drive1 ∧ ¬Drive2 ∧ ¬Drive3
3. (rj → (©rj ∨
∨
rk∈out(rj)©rk))
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4. 
∧
i∈{1,2,3}(Unsafei → ¬Drivei)
5. 
∧
rk∈out(rj)((rj ∧©rk)↔©Drivei)
where rk is the ith road segment in out(rj)
6.
∧
g♦rg
The first and second formulas restrict the allowable initial conditions for the environ-
ment and robot, respectively. The third formula restricts the motion of the vehicle such
that it may only transition to a new road segment rk if that segment is an outgoing road
from the vehicle’s current location rj (the vehicle may also remain in its current location
rj). The fourth formula requires that, if a particular road choice is deemed unsafe, the
vehicle is not allowed to drive on it. The fifth formula describes a set of formulas which
map the road segment transitions (i.e. moving from segment rj to segment rk) to their
corresponding Drivei propositions; when taken in conjunction with the fourth formula,
this restricts the vehicles movement to only those roads that are deemed safe. Finally,
the sixth formula requires that the vehicle repeatedly visit all of the goal locations, pro-
viding the liveness conditions for the synthesized controller.
5.3.3 Dynamic Obstacle Anticipation
This work anticipates the future states of tracked vehicles in the environment to evaluate
the safety of candidate robot actions, and arrive a the Boolean safety propositions X .
In order to anticipate the states (xk,obs) of tracked vehicles, a simple dynamics model is
assumed:
xk+1,obs = f(xk,obs). (5.5)
In this case, tracked vehicles are modeled as four-state bicycle robots, and the dynamics
model f consists of a bicycle dynamics model composed with simple lane-following
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and speed-keeping controllers. The high-level decision making of tracked objects is
modeled by assuming that the tracked object makes decisions randomly with uniform
probability (e.g., an object approaching a four-way intersection is assumed to decide to
turn left, go straight, and turn right with equal probability).
Both the bicycle-dynamics vehicle model and simple controller model are nonlinear,
so the true pdf over the tracked vehicle’s state will become progressively more non-
Gaussian as it is propagated forward in time. The anticipation algorithm used in this
paper uses GMMs to model the non Gaussian pdfs over the tracked vehicle’s state,
automatically detects and adapts the GMM to nonlinearities in the vehicle and controller
models, and captures the high-level decisions of the tracked vehicle by including discrete
states (for example, which lane or road the tracked vehicle is following) [25]. Given an
estimate of the state of a tracked object at time k (xk,obs), from tracking algorithms, the
anticipation algorithm calculates the pdf over the tracked vehicle’s state at future time
steps k + 1 through k +H , where H is the anticipation horizon:
N (xk,obs|µk,obs,Σk,obs) f→ {p (xk+1,obs) , .., p (xk+H,obs)} (5.6)
where p (xk+j,obs) is equal to:
p (xk+j,obs) =
Nk+j∑
i=1
wik+j · N
(
xk+j,obs|µik+j,obs,Σik+j,obs
)
. (5.7)
This probability distribution is computed by propagating the initial distribution through
the assumed dynamics model many times using the sigma-point transform [31]. The an-
ticipation algorithm used automatically detects accuracy errors due to nonlinearities in
the assumed model, and adapts the mixture accordingly by splitting individual mixands.
A detailed description is available in [25]. Section 5.3.4 describes how the anticipation
result is used to compute the safety of a candidate action.
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5.3.4 Sensor Abstraction
The anticipated tracked vehicle trajectories must be further abstracted to arrive at the
Boolean safe/unsafe environment propositions X .
To evaluate the safety of a candidate action, the robot projects its own behavior for-
ward in time for that candidate action, and computes the probability of collision between
itself executing that action and the anticipated behavior of tracked obstacles in the en-
vironment, up to an anticipation horizon. To arrive at a Boolean valued result, a safety
threshold on the probability of collision is defined, above which the candidate action is
unsafe and below which the candidate action is safe.
For the jth candidate action k timesteps in the future, the probability of collision is
defined:
pcoll
(
xjk,robot,xk,obs
)
(5.8)
where
xk,obs ∼ p(xk,obs)
xk,obs ∼
Nk∑
i=1
wik · N (xk,obs|µik,Σik) (5.9)
each mixand in the GMM can be treated independently when calculating the probability
of collision, so the calculation becomes
pcoll
(
xjk,robot,xk,obs
)
=
Nk∑
i=1
wik · pcoll
(
xjk,robot,x
i
k,obs
)
(5.10)
where
xik,obs ∼ N (µik,Σik). (5.11)
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(a) Candidate robot actions and antici-
pated obstacle behavior
(b) Collision probability for each candi-
date action over the anticipation horizon
Figure 5.4: Illustration of the safety evaluations for candidate actions. 5.4(a) shows the
future robot state and the anticipated obstacle state three seconds in the future. 5.4(b)
plots the likelihood of collision between the robot and the obstacle vehicle for each of
the three candidate actions considered by the robot.
Although the GMM representation allows the problem of computing collision prob-
abilities to be simplified, there is no exact method for computing the probability of
collision between two rectangles given a normal distribution over their relative posi-
tion. This work uses a tight upper bound on the collision probability proposed in [23].
The collision probability is computed by bloating the obstacle vehicle rectangle using
its heading uncertainty, finding the combined body of the bloating obstacle rectangle
and the robot rectangle, and then, after a coordinate transform, evaluating the cumu-
lative density function of the position states of the obstacle vehicle. Accuracy can be
improved, to the point of approaching the true probability of collision, by taking a sum
over several discrete obstacle heading ranges rather than bloating the obstacle vehicle
rectangle by its heading uncertainty.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the the anticipation of a tracked object, the calculated probabil-
ity of collision for candidate robot actions, and the abstraction to Boolean environment
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propositions. The robot is shown in red in Figure 5.4(a) approaching the intersection.
An obstacle vehicle is shown approaching from the opposite direction. The candidate
actions being considered by the robot are a left turn through the intersection, continuing
straight through the intersection, and a right turn through the intersection. The GMM
anticipation algorithm assumes the obstacle takes each available route with equal proba-
bility, and the pdf over its state is shown. The probability of collision for each candidate
action as a function of time is plotted in Figure 5.4(b). The straight and right turn ma-
neuvers, in this case, both have very low collision probabilities, and for the threshold
shown (0.1) would be labeled as safe. The left turn candidate action almost guarantees
a collision, and would be labeled as unsafe.
5.4 Analysis
The synthesized controller, discussed previously, is generated in a correct-by-construction
manner, which guarantees that the resulting controller satisfies the underlying task spec-
ification if the robot’s sensors and actuators are accurate. In this paper, as in [27, 28],
the probability that the robot satisfies its task is found with respect to errors in the robot’s
sensors. In particular, the environmental inputs to the controllerX = {Unsafe1, Unsafe2, Unsafe3}
will include erroneous valuations, due to errors in the obstacle anticipation and the ef-
fects of abstracting the probabilistic perception to Boolean values.
First, a set of sensor propositions X = {Unsafe1, Unsafe2, Unsafe3} is created;
these propositions are distinct from the environment propositions, and represent the ve-
hicle’s observation of the state of the environment (X , on the other hand, represents
the true state of the environment). In the ideal case the values of these propositions
would perfectly mimic the values of their corresponding environment propositions (i.e.,
Unsafei would be true precisely when Unsafei is true). The use of this set of proposi-
tions allows the model to capture inaccuracies in the vehicle’s perception and the effects
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of the abstraction, through false positives (Unsafei is true when Unsafei is false) and
false negatives (Unsafei is false when Unsafei is true).
A discrete, probabilistic model of the system is then created to capture the effects
of these inaccuracies. To do this, a probabilistic model of the evolution of the environ-
ment state is composed with a probabilistic model of the sensor observations and the
discrete, synthesized controller. The environment model, P (X ′|X, Y ), models changes
in the environment configuration X in the next time step (denoted by the ′ symbol), as a
conditional probability determined by the current configurations of the environment X
and robot Y ; for example, p(Unsafe′i) = 0.1 indicates that the probability that route
i is unsafe at any given time is 0.1. The sensor model, P (X
′|X ′, X, Y ), models the
new sensor configurationX
′
probabilistically, conditioned on the new environment con-
figuration X ′, the current sensor configuration X , and the current robot configuration
Y . The probability p(Unsafei
′|Unsafe′i) = 0.6, for example, indicates that the prob-
ability that the robot accurately anticipates route i to be unsafe, given that it actually
is unsafe, is 0.6. The final component of the composed system model is the synthe-
sized controller; this controller takes the form of a discrete, deterministic Finite-State
Automaton (as described in Section 5.2.2).
For a detailed description of the model composition process, the reader is referred
to [28]. Briefly, each state in the original automaton is adjusted to include the labeled
inputs as the sensor values (in addition to the robot configuration) such that each state
is now labeled with a sensor configuration X and robot configuration Y , as determined
by the synthesized controller. This state is then duplicated and augmented with each
allowable environment configuration (such that P (X ′|X, Y ) > 0), and each transition
is assigned a probability that is the product of P (X ′|X, Y ) and P (X ′|X ′, X, Y ) for the
given configurations. The resulting model is a Discrete-Time Markov Chain, where each
state is labeled with configurations for the environment X , the sensors X , and the robot
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Y , and all of the transitions are probabilistic.
Such a model allows for the use of off-the-shelf model checking software to find
the probability that the modeled system will satisfy a temporal logic formula. More
specifically, the work presented here uses the model checking software PRISM [38] to
compute the probability that the model satisfies a given LTL formula. This formula is
restricted to the sets of propositions used in the model (i.e., X , X , and Y), but is not
confined to those formulas that are used in the task specification.
This approach can be used to find the probability that the synthesized controller
will exhibit some desired behavior, given the modeled environment behavior and sensor
error. Additionally, the probabilities P (X ′|X, Y ) and P (X ′|X ′, X, Y ) can be adjusted
to quantify the effects of changes to the probabilistic models. In the work presented here,
the sensor error probability is adjusted, in order to determine the effect of changing the
abstraction threshold (described in Section 5.3.4).
5.5 Experimental Platform
The synthesized controller and anticipation-based safety sensors were implemented in
the control algorithms of Cornell’s 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge entry, Skynet[47].
This section provides a brief overview of Skynet’s software architecture and how the
synthesized controller and dynamic obstacle anticipation are incorporated, as well as
a description of the integration of virtual dynamic obstacles into the car’s perceived
environment.
5.5.1 Autonomous Car
Figure 5.5 provides an overview of Skynet’s software architecture. Skynet perceives its
own state using a tightly coupled pose estimator that fuses GPS, inertial measurements,
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Figure 5.5: Overview of the software architecture for the autonomous car, Skynet.
and vehicle odometry data to estimate Skynet’s position in an absolute, Earth-fixed co-
ordinate system. Skynet’s environmental perception uses a combination of RADAR
and and LIDAR sensors, whose returns are processed by LocalMap to arrive at “raw”
clusters and tracks.
The higher-level perception is performed in Scene Estimator, which consumes Skynet’s
pose estimate, raw tracked objects from Local Map, and the known map in order to
develop a high-level understanding of the world suitable for planning; Skynet’s Earth-
fixed pose estimate is translated to a more useful estimate of Skynet’s position within the
map, and raw tracked clusters are classified, and when appropriate, also placed within
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the map.
Skynet’s control algorithms are split into high-level and low-level tasks. The high-
level tasks are performed by the Arbiter component, which consumes the environment
estimate from Scene Estimator, the known map, and the current mission to make high-
level decisions, such as choosing a direction at an intersection, making a lane change,
performing a U-turn, etc. These high-level actions are executed by the low-level planner
Operational, which takes the commanded action, environment estimate from Scene Es-
timator, known map, and current sensor returns and makes vehicle actuation commands,
completing the planning loop.
Each perception and planning algorithm is implemented in C# or C++ on separate
Windows computers mounted in a rack in Skynet. The algorithms communicate with
each other and the vehicle over Skynet’s local network. A network of microcontrollers
triggers and timestamps data from Skynet’s sensors, ensuring accurate sensor fusion
even though Skynet’s perception algorithms are not implemented in hard real-time envi-
ronments. A more in-depth description of Skynet’s architecture is available in Cornell’s
DUC report [47].
Implementation of the synthesized controller and anticipation-based safety sensors
is done entirely within Skynet’s high-level planner, Arbiter. A new PC was built and
installed in Skynet to handle the high computational demands of the anticipation algo-
rithm, discussed in more detail in previous work [25]. The primary high-level planning
loop runs on its own thread, to ensure timely delivery of commands to Operational. The
anticipation and collision probability calculations parallelize nicely, and are performed
on separate threads. The previous complex, hand-coded high-level logic in Arbiter is re-
placed with a simple algorithm that steps through the synthesized high-level controller
based on the results of the anticipation. Anticipation and collision checking is run con-
stantly, not just when the state machine needs a result, and is able to anticipate the
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behavior of vehicles of interest in the environment to a horizon of 4.5 seconds at greater
than 3 Hz. When the state machine needs to make a transition, the transition is made
based on the most recent anticipation results, which are never older than 1/3 seconds.
5.5.2 Virtual Obstacles
Because the experiment is intended to verify theoretical and simulation results that show
a number of collisions, it could not be performed with other physical vehicles on the
road. Instead, the dynamic obstacles used in the experiment were virtual objects, that
were transmitted to, and perceived by Skynet. Each of the obstacles was controlled by
a human driver who operated a simulated vehicle in an open-source driving simulation,
using a driving wheel and pedals attached to a laptop computer; a picture of this setup
is shown in Figure 5.6.
The position and heading of each dynamic obstacle was transmitted via wireless
network to the autonomous vehicle, such that Skynet perceived the simulated cars as
being physically present (as vehicle tracks in Scene Estimator), and tracked and antici-
pated their motion as described in Section 5.3.3. Similarly, the human drivers perceived
Skynet as another actor in the computer simulation, thereby achieving realistic human
driver-Skynet interactions without the risk of vehicle damage and injury in a collision.
This simulation setup allowed for the operation of the experiment, without the safety
and damage concerns associated with operating real cars in scenarios where collisions
were expected.
5.6 Results
This section describes the resulting behavior of the autonomous vehicle operating in the
scenario presented in Section 5.3.1. The behavior is evaluated with respect to the safety
114
Figure 5.6: Picture of the setup for the dynamic obstacles. A driving wheel was attached
to a laptop computer, which was running an open-source driving simulator that was
modified to show to the positions of all of the obstacle vehicles and Skynet.
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of the autonomous vehicles operation (avoiding collisions with other vehicles), and the
results of a formal analysis are compared with experimental data.
5.6.1 Formal Analysis
As discussed in Section 5.4, a probabilistic model of the system was created and used to
formally verify properties of the system, using the PRISM model checking software. To
get the probabilities used in the formal model, P (X ′|X, Y ) and P (X ′|X ′, X, Y ), statis-
tical data was extracted from a high-fidelity simulation of the scenario. This simulation
used dynamic obstacles with simple waypoint-following controllers (with no avoidance
logic), and tracked the positions of the obstacles and the autonomous car. Addition-
ally, the decisions made by the autonomous vehicle were stored for each intersection,
along with the calculated collision probabilities (from the obstacle anticipation). This
information is used to calculate the model probabilities for the environment and sensor
models.
The environment model P (X ′|X, Y ) describes the probability that, when the vehicle
arrives at any intersection, each of the possible routes is unsafe. These probabilities
were modeled as independent of the previous value or the location of the robot, and
were found to be:
p(Unsafe′1) = 0.06490
p(Unsafe′2) = 0.12876
p(Unsafe′3) = 0.23636
These probabilities were found by computing the fraction of each choiceDrive1,Drive2,
and Drive3 (which correspond to the Unsafe1, Unsafe2, and Unsafe3, propositions,
respectively), that resulted in a collision when taken by the autonomous vehicle. That
is, p(Unsafe′i) was found by dividing the number of Drivei choices that resulted in a
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collision by the number of Drivei choices that were taken, in total. These probabili-
ties were obtained from simulation data of 1848 intersection traversals, and provide a
more accurate model than treating all of the Unsafei sensors identically (i.e., letting
p(Unsafe′1) = p(Unsafe
′
2) = p(Unsafe
′
3) and determining the single value from all
decisions made).
The sensor error model P (X
′|X ′, X, Y ) was constructed similarly, though it is im-
portant to note that these probabilities also change as the abstraction threshold is ad-
justed. In this case, the error model was used to model the probability that the ab-
stracted sensor correctly determined when a road was unsafe p(Unsafei
′|Unsafe′i),
and the probability that the abstracted sensor correctly determined when a road was
safe p(¬Unsafei′|¬Unsafe′i), for each of the possible choices i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. These
probabilities were modeled to be dependent only on the value of their corresponding
environment proposition, and independent of the previous sensor values or the robot’s
location. Because the sensor information is obtained by abstracting the probabilistic an-
ticipation to a Boolean value for the sensor, these model probabilities are also dependent
on the threshold value used in that abstraction (e.g., if the threshold line in Figure 5.4(b)
is lowered to ≈ 0.075 then trajectory 1, in addition to trajectory 2, becomes unsafe).
Figure 5.7 shows the sensor model probabilities as a function of the abstraction
threshold. As with the environment model probabilities, these probabilities were cal-
culated from simulation data (from the same 1848 intersections used to determine the
environment probabilities). Unlike the environment model probabilities, and because
the anticipation and abstraction is performed identically for each sensor, the sensor per-
formance was modeled such that all of the sensors (Unsafe1, Unsafe2, and Unsafe3)
have the same probabilities. In this case, for each choice taken by the autonomous ve-
hicle, the abstracted value of the corresponding sensor was compared to the result of
the choice. That is, p(Unsafei
′|Unsafe′i) was found, for a given threshold value, by
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Figure 5.7: Sensor probability models, as a function of the abstraction threshold.
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dividing the number of choices taken that were unsafe (resulted in a collision) and were
deemed so by the abstracted threshold, by the total number of choices taken that were
unsafe. The same process was used to find p(¬Unsafei′|¬Unsafe′i): the number of
choices taken that were safe (no collision) and were deemed so by the abstracted thresh-
old, was divided by the total number of choices taken that were safe.
Note that, as the threshold (collision probability at which a road is considered un-
safe) increases, the vehicle’s behavior becomes more aggressive. This can be seen in
Figure 5.7, where the abstracted sensor becomes more likely to consider a road to be
safe, and less likely to consider a road to be unsafe. Additionally, there is an obvious
jump that occurs at the smallest non-zero threshold (0.01) shown in the figure. This is
because the probabilistic anticipation represents the states of the obstacles with GMMs;
as a result, the calculated probability of collision will always be greater than 0 (even
if it is very small) and the abstracted sensor, at a threshold of 0, will determine all
possible choices to be unsafe. The resulting model is such that p(Unsafei
′
) = 1 and
p(¬Unsafei′) = 0, regardless of the environment proposition. Additionally, this fig-
ure shows abrupt changes in the probabilities (e.g., around the threshold of 0.5); this is
likely due to the repetition of discrete events in the scenario (the discrete choices made
by the dynamic obstacles), where a small change in the abstraction threshold may alter
the vehicle’s behavior in multiple events.
Given this probabilistic model of the environment and the sensors, a model of the dis-
crete system can be composed (as briefly discussed in Section 5.4), and a model checker
can be used to compute the probability that the model satisfies a given LTL property.
Figure 5.8 shows the probability that the vehicle safely (without colliding with a dy-
namic obstacle) traverses 8, 16, and 32 intersections, as a function of the abstraction
threshold value. This is found as the probability that the composed model satisfies the
LTL formula∧i∈{1,2,3} (Unsafei → ¬Drivei), within a bounded number of intersec-
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Figure 5.8: Probability that the autonomous vehicle satisfies  ∧i∈{1,2,3} (Unsafei →
¬Drivei) bounded by the number of traversed intersections, and found as a function of
the abstraction threshold.
tion traversals. For Figure 5.8, as well as Figure 5.7, the probabilities are calculated for
a range of threshold values from 0 to 1, by increments of 0.01.
As would be expected, as the bound on the number of intersections increases, the
safety probability decreases. Additionally, as the abstraction threshold increases and the
vehicle drives more aggressively, the probability that it safely traverses all of its intersec-
tions decreases. As with Figure 5.7, this figure shows an abrupt change as the threshold
becomes non-zero; at a threshold of 0 the abstracted sensor will always determine all
routes to be unsafe, and the vehicle will remain stopped. As a result, the vehicle will
satisfy the LTL formula  ∧i∈{1,2,3} (Unsafei → ¬Drivei) with a probability of 1.0
(since Drivei will always be false).
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Figure 5.9: Vehicle roadmap, superimposed on a picture of the parking lot where the
experiment was conducted. Photo source: Google Earth
5.6.2 Experiment
To validate the formal analysis, an experiment was conducted to find the statistical like-
lihood that the vehicle will safely complete a run. This experiment used the full-scale
autonomous vehicle, running a synthesized controller to make discrete decisions when
arriving at intersections. The vehicle operated on the roadmap shown in Figure 5.3,
navigating a sufficiently empty parking lot in the imposed lanes. A picture of the lanes,
superimposed on an overhead photograph of the parking lot, is shown in Figure 5.9.
During operation, the vehicle tracked and predicted the motion of three dynamic obsta-
cles operating on the same road system.
All three obstacles were controlled by human drivers, where each of the drivers was
given a prescribed path to follow, and told to drive as if they had the right of way at
each intersection, and to actively avoid collisions with the autonomous vehicle only in
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.10: The three different paths for the obstacle vehicles, as driven by different
operators in a driving simulation.
Abstraction Threshold Collision-Free Runs Total Runs Percentage
0.25 8 9 0.8889
0.50 6 8 0.7500
0.75 7 11 0.6364
Table 5.1: Experiment results for 3 different abstraction threshold values.
the case where they were driving behind it in the same lane (i.e., not to rear-end the au-
tonomous vehicle). The three different paths for these drivers are shown in Figure 5.10.
For the experiment, all three obstacle vehicles and the autonomous vehicle drove
around the roadmap continuously, while the autonomous vehicle recorded it’s own pose
and that of the obstacle vehicles, as well as the decisions made at each intersection. The
data was then split into runs based on the 4 goal segments shown in Figure 5.3; each
run consisted of the autonomous vehicle driving from one of the goal regions to the next
goal (in numerical order). Split this way, each run consisted of precisely 8 intersections,
where the autonomous vehicle queried the synthesized controller to make a decision
regarding the next road segment. Table 5.1 shows the results (the number of collision-
free runs, the total number of runs, and the percentage of runs that were collision-free)
for three different values of the abstraction threshold.
As the abstraction threshold increases, the autonomous vehicle allows a higher prob-
ability of collision with the obstacles to be considered safe. As a result, the higher
abstraction thresholds yield a smaller percentage of the total runs without collisions.
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That is, the experimental data shows that, as the autonomous vehicle drives more ag-
gressively, it becomes less likely to complete its run without colliding with an obstacle
vehicle.
5.6.3 Results comparison
Figure 5.11 shows a comparison of the formal analysis results with the experimental
data. The formal analysis results show the probability that the vehicles satisfies the for-
mula  ∧i∈{1,2,3} (Unsafei → ¬Drivei) for a time-bound of 8 intersection traversals;
the experimental results show the percentage of runs (each consisting of 8 intersec-
tion traversals) during which the autonomous vehicle successfully avoided collisions
with the obstacle vehicles. Additionally, the experimental results are shown with 95%
confidence bounds on the percentage of collision-free runs. The figure also shows the
resulting probabilities of a formal analysis (at thresholds of 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75) for a
probabilistic model of the system where the environment and sensor probabilities are
obtained statistically from the experimental data, rather than the simulation data. Due
to the limited amount of experimental data available, the model was evaluated only at
these three thresholds. In order to evaluate the model for the full range of thresholds,
more experimental data would need to be collected, explicitly for this purpose (the ve-
hicle would need to be set to ignore the calculated collision probability when making
decisions, such that the accuracy of the sensors could be evaluated even at high collision
probabilities).
As shown in Figure 5.11, the experimental data yields results that follow the same
trend as the formal analysis results (where a higher threshold yields a lower safety prob-
ability), though the experiment results show a higher safety probability than the formal
analysis results at the corresponding thresholds. This difference can be due a number of
different factors.
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of the results for the formal analysis with the experimental
results (with 95% confidence intervals). The results of a formal analysis where the
model probabilities were obtained from the experimental data (rather than simulation
data) is also shown.
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One likely cause is the behavior of the human drivers. The model probabilities used
in the formal analysis (which are shown in Figure 5.7) were obtained from a simulated
system, where the obstacle vehicles were driven by simple waypoint-following behav-
iors. By contrast, the experiment was conducted with human drivers controlling the ob-
stacle vehicles; while the human drivers were instructed to behave as if they always had
the right-of-way, it is reasonable to expect that their natural reactions to close encounters
with other vehicles would lead them to actively avoid collisions in some scenarios where
a waypoint-following controller would not. In fact, if the experimental data is used to
obtain the statistics for the probabilities in the formal model, an analysis of the model
gives results that are more closely aligned with the experimental results, as shown in
Figure 5.11. At an abstraction threshold of 0.25, analysis of the formal model obtained
from experiment data yields a safety probability of 0.8506; for abstraction thresholds of
0.5 and 0.75, the safety probabilities are 0.7300 and 0.6544, respectively. These values
align much more closely with the experimental data, though it is important to note that
considerably less experimental data was used to find the model statistics than when they
were generated from simulation data.
Additionally, the experimental results shown in the figure were obtained from a small
number of samples. Due to the small quantity of data available, the actual values of
the safety probabilities are relatively uncertain (as evidenced by the large spread of the
confidence intervals in Figure 5.11). Results obtained from a larger quantity of data may
be closer to the formal analysis results.
5.7 Conclusions
This paper describes a method for interpreting the probabilistic anticipation of dynamic
obstacles as abstract sensor values for a synthesized, correct-by-construction controller.
The approach is applied to the problem of a full-scale autonomous vehicle operating in
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an environment where it must avoid other vehicles; the approach is implemented and
running in real-time on Cornell’s 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge entry vehicle. During
execution, the motion of the dynamic obstacles are anticipated, and used to calculate the
expected probability of collision between the obstacles and the autonomous vehicle. If
this value is above a specified threshold, the vehicle’s route is deemed unsafe, and the
high-level controller, which was synthesized from a task specification that required that
the vehicle only drive on roads that were safe, directs the vehicle to avoid that route.
The formal analysis of a discrete model of the system, as well as experimental data
from execution of the autonomous car, illustrates the effects of changes in the sensor
abstraction threshold on the behavior of the autonomous vehicle. Both the formal anal-
ysis and the experimental results show that a higher threshold value results in more
aggressive behavior for the vehicle, and a lower probability of safely completing a run.
Furthermore, the agreement between the experimental data and the formal results sug-
gest that the system model and analysis are viable methods for assessing the behavior of
an autonomous system operating with a synthesized controller.
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